

Jürgen Gispert

Leipzig, Germany

juergengispert@web.de

orcid: 0009-0008-8811-3734

ARMENIA AS A BRIDGE OF CIVILIZATION*

Abstract

If we think of the book about Musa Dag, we come to the topics of medium and memory. Anything can become a medium, but this does not make it arbitrary in terms of its content. The countless possibilities of the interrelated existence of signs find their limit(s) in the need for action that interrupts the process. Constellations (Walter Benjamin) form a series from an Armenian internal perspective that promises the eternal return of the same.

Where everything has the same effect, the question of the origin of the single event becomes interesting. However, the origin is not to be sought in an absolute beginning. Rather, the event has its own origin, which can be found in (individual) thinking and its (collective) preconditions.

The question of the origin of an event can be discussed using the example of Artsakh by asking what echo (Walter Benjamin) the loss of Artsakh has in Armenian government policy. To this end, a number of commemorative rituals and events are described against the background of and as signs of a transformation. The change in the current politics of remembrance will be questioned using a systems theory approach with regard to possible destabilization of the social system.

Key words – Politics of memory, medium, constellation (Walter Benjamin), origin of the event, loss of Artsakh, commemorative rituals, systems theory, social destabilization.

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ՀԱՅԱՍՏԱՆԸ ՈՐՊԵՍ ՔԱՂԱՔԱԿՐԹԱԿԱՆ ԿԱՄՈՒՐՁ

Ամփոփում

Եթե անդրադառնանք Մուսա Լեռան մասին գրքին, ապա կհասնենք **մեդիումի** և **հիշողության** թեմաներին: Ցանկացած բան կարող է դառնալ մեդիում, սակայն դա չի նշանակում, որ դրա բովանդակությունը դառնում է կամայական: Նշանների փոխկապակցված գոյության անթիվ հնարավորությունները սահմանափակվում են գործողության պահանջով, որը ընդհատում է այդ գործընթացը: Համաստեղությունները (ըստ Վալտեր Բենյամինի) ձևավորում են մի շարք՝ դիտարկված հայկական ներքին հայացքի տեսանկյունից, որը խոստանում է նույնի հավերժական վերադարձը:

Երբ ամեն ինչ ունի նույն ազդեցությունը, առանձին իրադարձության ծագման հարցը դառնում է ուշագրավ: Սակայն այդ ծագումը չպետք է փնտրել որպես բացարձակ սկիզբ: Ավելի ճիշտ կլինի դիտարկել, որ յուրաքանչյուր իրադարձություն ունի իր ներհատուկ ծագումը, որը կարելի է հայտնաբերել **անհատական** մտածողության մեջ և դրա **համախմբված** նախադրյալներում:

Իրադարձության ծագման հարցը կարելի է դիտարկել Արցախի օրինակի միջոցով՝ հարցադրելով, թե ինչ արձագանք է (ըստ Վալտեր Բենյամինի ըմբռնման) առաջացնում Արցախի կորուստը Հայաստանի կառավարության քաղաքականության մեջ: Այդ նպատակով նկարագրվում են մի շարք հիշողութենական ծեսեր և իրադարձություններ՝ ներկայացված որպես վերափոխման նշաններ այդ փոփոխությունների համատեքստում: Հիշողության քաղաքականության ներկայիս փոփոխությունը վերլուծվում է համակարգային տեսության շրջանակում՝ դիտարկելով սոցիալական համակարգի հնարավոր ապակայունացման հնարավորությունները:

Բանալի բառեր – հիշողության քաղաքականություն, մեդիում, համաստեղություն (Վալտեր Բենյամին), իրադարձության ծագում,

Արցախի կորուստ, հիշողութենական ծեսեր, համակարգային տե-
սություն, սոցիալական ապակայունացում:

Юрген Гисперт (Лейпциг, Германия)

АРМЕНИЯ КАК МОСТ МЕЖДУ ЦИВИЛИЗАЦИЯМИ

Резюме

При обращении к книге о Муса-Даге актуализируются вопросы, свя-
занные с понятиями **«медиум-посредник»** и **память**. Любой факт или собы-
тие может выступать в роли медиума-посредника, однако это не означает, что
его содержание становится произвольным. Множество вариантов взаимо-
действия знаков ограничено необходимостью действия, которое прерывает
этот процесс. Согласно Вальтеру Беньямину, созвездия образуют после-
довательность, которую можно рассматривать с точки зрения восприятия из
Армении, символизирующей вечное возвращение к одному и тому же.

В ситуации, когда все явления производят одинаковый эффект, воз-
никает вопрос о том, откуда взялось конкретное событие. Однако его истоки
не стоит рассматривать как точку отсчёта. Более верно будет сказать, что у
каждого события есть свои внутренние корни, которые можно найти в инди-
видуальном мышлении и его общих предпосылках.

Вопрос о происхождении события может быть рассмотрен через
призму теории Вальтера Беньямина на примере Арцаха и отражения его
утраты на политической стратегии правительства Армении. В рамках данного
анализа представляется целесообразным рассмотреть ряд мемориальных
ритуалов и событий, которые можно интерпретировать как индикаторы
трансформационных процессов в контексте этих изменений. В дальнейшем
планируется провести исследование текущих изменений в **политике памяти**
с использованием системного подхода, с целью выявления потенциальных
рисков дестабилизации социальной системы.

Ключевые слова - политика памяти, медиум-посредник, созвездие
(Вальтер Беньямин), происхождение события, потеря Арцаха, мемориаль-
ные ритуалы, системная теория, социальная дестабилизация.

Introduction

One of my first readings about Armenia was an anthology called "The Armenians. Bridge between Occident and Orient" (Novello, 1986). The characterization of the Armenians as a "bridge" raises some questions. Are the Armenians a medium to get from the Orient to the Occident? I think this would cause some contradiction, which is related to the use of the term *medium*, if one understands it as a mere instrument or center. But a medium is not a monad or a thing between entities external to it, which it connects. The history of the Armenians transcends the image of a bridge. This becomes clear, for example, by examining the geopolitical situation of Armenia and its effects on the people living there. Once again, Khorenatsi's famous book "Hayots patmutiun" is helpful here, as it contains both the history of Armenia and the history of the Armenians. The two are not congruent. We will deal with this in the context of Armenia's present.

Armenia's geopolitical situation represents a fundamental constellation in its history. The Armenians, the land on which they have lived for thousands of years, have historically been surrounded by sometimes hostile forces. They have created and continue to create their existence from their interaction with these forces. However, this in turn sometimes creates so much pressure that explosions and implosions occur, leading to emigration and flight. The genesis of the Armenian diaspora is directly linked to this phenomenon. Consequently, the existence of the Armenian diaspora cannot be imagined without this phenomenon. In this respect, there is a dynamic between the diaspora and the heartland, from whose interactions each of the two sides draws a corresponding source of energy, which also includes the catapult effect just described. I think that we are living in such a phase of high pressure, which is accompanied by explosions, but there is also the danger of a systemic implosion.

Franz Werfel's book about Musa Dagh is about such explosions and implosions. As a book medium, "Musa Dagh" made a significant contribution to the world learning about the genocide in the first place. Historically documented events such as the conversation between Johannes Lepsius and Enver Pasha, one of the architects of the genocide, made the book an important piece of counter-history. The fate of the book was that it was banned by the Nazis immediately after its publication. As evidence of a counter-history, it was intended to be forgotten.

This brings us to the important topic of memory. The history of the Armenians is characterized by so many conflicts, both internal and external, that we are tempted to speak of an eternal return of the same due to their similarities, whereby the same does not mean the identical (Skirl, 20114). This term, which is discussed by the German philosophers Friedrich Nietzsche and Walter Benjamin, finds its most recent

application in the genocide in Artsakh, where the 120,000 Armenians living there were forcibly expelled. But we also find this phenomenon in the case of the prevention of an event organized by the same Aliyev on 6th March this year in Berlin, when a book on art and culture was to be presented in Artsakh. The events are so similar that one is inclined to ask about their respective origins. Can one event be traced back causally to another? An event has no absolute beginning, but has its own origin, which can be found in the individual thought. The individual thought in turn, to follow the memory theorist Maurice Halbwachs, gives birth to many collectives from which it springs. An example of this is Charles Aznavour with his famous quote in which he refers to his multiple origins in nationality and religion (<https://gutezitate.com/zitat/225242>) or William Saroyan, when he has his ashes scattered over three countries in the world in order to create his genuine transnationality.

In this sense, we can describe 1915 as a discontinuity, a break (Foucault), which goes hand in hand with what appears to be a fundamental change. What significance do the events in Artsakh have for the government of the current republic in this respect? This gives rise to a circumstance that I had not noticed at first, but which has its logic: The moment Artsakh seemed lost, the moment Artsakh as a subject of an Armenian nation seemed more or less over for the government. However, every medium has its pre- and post-history (Weber n.d.:3), which makes a change of perspective possible. For the Armenian government, Artsakh has taken on a different thematic significance, which has resulted in what is called "loss of Artsakh". If it has taken on a lower thematic priority for the government, this must be reflected in other government actions. Thus we can consult the Armenian annual calendar for the following anniversaries: New Year, April 24, May 1, May 9 and the Berlin event. For the analysis, I make use of systems theory, among other things, and take the concepts discussed in the study by a Leipzig sociologist of religion.

The Armenian Nation as an Entity

Every entity consists of different levels or layers that build on and relate to each other (Stadler, 2024, 16). If we describe the Armenian nation as such an entity, it can be broken down into the above-mentioned parts of diasporas in their relationships to each other and to the Republic of Armenia. Artsakh also belongs to this. The relationships that the individual diasporas form with their respective host countries must also be taken into account in order to enter into a relationship with the heartland.

It is therefore historically evident that we start from the model of tripolarity as the normal case and derive from this the government's desire to give priority to an identity of state, territory and citizen, i.e. bipolarity.

We maintain the aforementioned complexity of diaspora and heartland and ask to what extent the current policy is having a destabilizing effect on the Armenian system as a whole that could lead to an implosion. Even if no conclusive answer can be given to this, the cases I have discussed are intended to raise awareness. For example, it should be asked how Artsakh's experienced fate affects the current transformation and whether this is a case of reductionism, of which Artsakh and his people are the victims.

In terms of system theory, a distinction is made between eliminative and explanatory reductionism. Eliminative reductionism negates the causal powers of higher-level entities. In contrast, the approach of explanatory reductionism is to show how the forces of the higher order arise through the elements of the lower order and the relationships between them” (Stadler, 2024, 18).

Let us take the Armenian nation, as we have received it since Khorenatsi, as a higher-order entity as opposed to the model favored by the government. In terms of the definition, the causal power of the Armenian nation as a higher-order entity is denied.

If we describe Artsakh as a *medium* with a pre- and post-history, then it is embedded in a program based on the fundamental transformation of Armenia's social and political system, of which the loss of Artsakh is a part.

In terms of emergence theory, we can assume dynamic structures that are not "maintained by a stable network of relationships, but by constantly practicing a balance between the internal components that are in tension with each other" (Stadler, 2024, 21).

In order to be able to deal appropriately with the balancing acts, we use two further terms: morphogenesis and morphostasis (Stadler, 2024, 20). Morphostatic causes are not necessarily part of an entity. An environment suitable for the existence of the system/entity is also important. (Stadler, 2024,20). Morphostasis can be defined as "those processes in complex system-environment exchanges that tend to preserve or maintain a system's given form, organization, or state [...]." (Stadler, 2024, 20) Morphogenetic causes are responsible for processes that lead to the emergence or change in form of entities. If a system is in a morphostatic state, the modifications "have not exceeded the limits of the structural limits of the range of the type of an entity". However, they can also change the form and are therefore morphogenetic in character, but they can also end the existence of the form (Stadler, 2024, 21). The question could

then be asked whether the current policy in Armenia is morphogenetically sustainable or morphostatically destructive?

For the discussion of the events mentioned, I draw on data material that I collected for a series on Armenia that I organized on a Leipzig radio station, the origin of which ironically goes back to the Azerbaijani occupation of territories in the Republic of Armenia in September 2022.

About the day of remembrance – April 24

Celebration days and anniversaries are sometimes sacred days that symbolize religious and historical events that are considered important and are therefore also attractive for other areas of society and institutions, such as the scientific sphere. They have an emergent effect with regard to new forms of events/institutions, which are then grouped around this significant day and keep it relevant to current events.

One example is April 23rd, when since 1999 young people have tended to meet on Opera-Place in Yerevan, burn a Turkish flag together and then walk to the genocide memorial. This year, for a well-known reason, an Azerbaijani flag was also burned.

Due to its national significance, April 24 can not only determine the course of important political events, but also lend them its own symbolism. We are reminded of April 23, 2018, when former President Serzh Sargsyan officially resigned the day before Remembrance Day in order to prevent violence on this day in particular. It is therefore worth looking at the celebration of this day. For this I choose 24.4.22 in Washington and comparatively 24,4,24. in order to discuss the differences between the Diaspora and the Armenian government, bearing in mind the Artsakh theme.

April 24, 2022

The commemoration on 24 April 2022 caused quite a stir in the diaspora. The Armenian ambassador in Washington at the time refrained from taking part in the official commemorations organised by the Armenian Church and Diaspora organisers there. Instead, the ambassador and staff went behind the embassy walls to lay flowers at a khachkar. There was criticism from the diaspora (Top News 2022).

If we look at the figuration of this staging, there is a sharp difference between the two groups. A wall separates the diaspora, the church from the representation of the republic. By looking at the embassy walls on the inside, The abassador looks

through the diaspora community on the outside. Conversely, the diaspora church as a historical institution looks at its own positioning: it sees the Armenian government and its request as just an episode. The Armenian Church also had a relationship with Stalin, who rejected it. Of course, there is no structural isomorphism here.

The ambassador goes through a protocol by commemorating at the cross stone. This follows the argumentation of the German memory theorists Jan and Aleida Assmann, for example: a day of remembrance is commemorated here in an obligatory manner and can be described as mechanistic in its character (Gispert, 2022). The subject of Artsakh is present through his absence. It oscillates between the parties on this side and the other side of the wall, but is not itself performed in a dialog.

The process in the Armenian embassy becomes dynamic in the moment of the embassy group in front of the cross stone. By excluding the church institution and members of the diaspora, something seems to change in the character of the structure inherent in the Cross-stone: The interplay of becoming and passing away, a supporting moment of the idea of the cross-stone, is broken up: the relationship between the uniqueness of the event and the "re-collection" of the whole by the individual. Instead, the government wants to assign the idea of the cross-stone to the past. On April 24, the cross stone is rhetorically referred to as a thing of the past.

A video clip posted in June gives us insight into the PM's stance on the Cross Stone heritage site. Pashinyan rails against the cross stone (<https://x.com/301arm/status/1803102487655706676>). Among other things, he criticizes the supposed accumulation of cross-stones, which are placed there for all sorts of reasons. They would overemphasize the past over the present. Cross stones would be hung around the necks of the next generation's children and thus become a burden. In this way, he wants to dissolve the tense relationship between the Armenian nation and individual events that has coagulated over thousands of years. Instead of the individual integration of a single event into a mythically charged whole, which goes back to the early days of Armenian Christianity, there is now only the individual. Pashinyan criticizes the concept of the cross stone for its alleged repetitiveness, mere reproduction, from which, it seems, he can gain no productive sensuality.

However, space is traversed in the repetition, which brings us to the time factor as a medium. The medium of the cross-stone is not equal in its repeatability, as it appears to be linked to the medium of time. An individual thought, fate, interrupts the apparent infinity created by the ornamentation of the *khachkar* and inscribes itself into it in equal measure. However, since this happens an infinite number of times, the individual thought is also suspended in this infinity, which is conducive to the interpretation of the cross stone as a symbol of eternity. By

ignoring this, Pashinyan wants to put *khachkar* and everything that he believes is connected with it aside, to historicize it. His attempt at historicization itself, however, seems rather ahistorical when measured against the basic character of the Armenian nation, which is based on a tripartite relationship between the diaspora and the heartland. Metaphorically speaking, the *khachkar* takes up the reduction to a bipolarity only as an episode and possibly engraves it on the cross-stone in this episodic manner - but then again it can also be read as a counter-history.

I think this gives us an example of eliminative reductionism in current politics. We can also read the Artsakh policy into this. A supporting and further example of this is provided by

April 24, 2024, Yerevan

In order to grasp the emotional state that 24.4. triggers in those affected, we fall back on the category of the term "**mythomoteur**", which originates from the British historian and sociologist A.D. Smith (1986). According to this, every ethnic group possesses a peculiar complex of myths, memories and symbols, which Smith calls the "myth-symbol complex". This complex refers to the origins and lineages of the group (Smith 1986:57f).

In this sense, 24.4. should be understood as a *mythomoteur*. What social contribution does the Prime Minister attribute to it, as we learn in a speech on this day (Pashinyan, 2024).

Pashinyan used the commonly used word "**meds jeghern**" for the genocide. However, only the term "genocide" is justiciable. I learned that the Armenian prime minister received a positive response from the Turkish side for his sentences. In addition, the content of Pashinyan's *meds jeghern* has been criticized. While it generally formulates an Armenian internal view, Pashinyan reduces the ideal content to the character of a trauma, which he wants to overcome. The people lack "the tradition of statehood" and "above all a political spirit", and consequently an understanding of the world and its rules. This mental trauma prevents them from participating in international competition, which would lead to problems in grasping the realities and factors of historical processes.

Pashinyan equates state/nation and territory. He negatively derives the psychological constitution qualified as traumatic from a functioning participation in the world economy as an internationally recognized state. For Pashinyan, relationships on an international level are primarily economic relationships. Here, the church appears to be synonymous with a loss of reality and can therefore be assigned to the past. Arman Babadjanyan, an Armenian politician close to the government, links the wealth of the church to institutional uselessness and asks why it is needed for the current development (according to an informant).

The unity of state/nation and territory claimed by Pashinyan is separated from its past. Instead, he calls for "vital interests" of the current state:

We must stop the searches of a homeland, because we have found that homeland, our Promised Land, where milk and honey flow. For us, the commemoration of the martyrs of the Meds Yeghern should not symbolize the lost homeland, but the found and real homeland, in the person of the Republic of Armenia, whose competitive, legitimate, thoughtful and creative policies can exclude a repetition (Pashinyan, 2024).

Excursus: The Term Meds Yeghern

However, it is worth taking a closer look at Pashinyan's use of the word **meds yeghern**. Professor Gasparyan from YSU has addressed the semantic field and the English equivalents of the word in an article (Gasparyan 2010). In it, she defines translation as the juxtaposition of two or more languages, with the object of tracing semantic similarities between the units of those languages. In other words, translating means finding elements in the target language which are capable of conveying the semantic contents of the source language words adequately." There are no absolute synonyms "of the minimal distinctive semantic features operating in the semantic structures of different lexical units... (Gasparyan, 2010, 140).

As a result, Meds Yeghern is an equivalent to "genocide".

For Walter Benjamin [t]he task of the translator consists in finding that intended effect [*Intention*] upon the language into which he is translating which produces in it the echo of the original. [...] Not only does the aim of translation differ from that of a literary work – it intends language as a whole, taking an individual work in an alien language as a point of departure but it is a different effort altogether. The intention of the poet is spontaneous, primary, graphic; that of the translator is derivative, [...] ultimate, ideational (Benjamin, 1923).

We also read this in Gasparyan when she refers to the efforts of searching for semantic equivalences via sources such as dictionaries and synonym dictionaries. What is important here is the character of the echo, which in its emergence has to do with what Benjamin calls the intended effect. An Armenian friend, a Germanist and translator, once told me that you actually have to retranslate a book every five years, which brings the factors of space and time into play. So how does Nikol Pashinyan use meds yeghern, six years after coming to power? Let's take the circumstances of Barak Obama's visit to Turkey in 2009 as a comparison.

Barak Obama visited Turkey at the beginning of his first presidency in 2009. In the period before that, he made clear statements about his stance on the 1915

genocide, but now he seemed to refrain from using the word genocide. Instead, he used the word *meds yeghern*. What did he mean by this? By using *meds yeghern*, he wanted both to avoid the political cliff on the ground in Turkey and to express what the equivalent is. The context in which he uses the equivalent remains the same. Pashinyan, however, reduced it to *yeghern* so as not to alienate Erdogan as part of his own program; the benevolent reaction from Turkey supposedly proved him right.

The echo is the third, the result of the encounter between translation and original. But the translation already contains this echo, which we can make useful: Because Pashinyan could have used *genocide*, but didn't want to. Obama's diplomacy leaves the ideal context of *meds yeghern* - alternatively wanting to be read as *genocide* - untouched; Pashinyan's strategy is at its expense.

The procedure in Washington and Yerevan on Remembrance Day suggests a drastic change in official commemoration policy, which must have implicitly affected the issue of Artsakh even then. The government equates the territory on which Armenians live with the concept of the Armenian nation. In doing so, however, something essential happens to the self-image of the Armenians. By the Armenian government separating the "nation" from the "Armenian nation", the term "nation" changes for the Armenian internal view. An indication of this is the textbook reform, through which the Ministry of Culture wants to separate a "history of Armenia" from a "history of Armenians" and has been criticized for doing so. And "*azgayin*" falls out of this conceptual reinterpretation because, similar to the above *meds yeghern* for genocide, it finds its equivalent in the already existing concept of nation, which is why it was not adopted. The Armenian *azgayin* also transcends historical territorial borders, which does not mean that it does not respect them. However, the government's concept of nation is reductive and incoherent (Abrahamian, 2005, 145f). We can perhaps start from two concepts of nations here. The more original of the two encompasses the second, current one, processually and transcends it. This potentially means that it can also pass again.

However, what has been said has both theoretical and practical relevance: For it is evident that a change in the territorial discussion in favor of Baku already meant the end for Artsakh. For if I do not insist on the discourse on the untenability of the historical dualism of the right to self-determination and territorial integrity, the practice of which is as elastic as chewing gum, then I will be ridding myself of the history associated with this stain. But that seems to be exactly the plan, as the discussion about the amendment to the constitution repeatedly demanded by Baku shows that the PM tackled it with a slight delay at the beginning of July. (panorama.am, 2019)

An important part of the new constitution is that it should include, among other things, the renunciation of the previously formulated claim to lost territories and the final renunciation of Karabakh. Every state's constitution includes a national coat of arms to which it symbolically refers. And it is well known that this coat of arms features Mount Ararat. The discussions about the national coat of arms are older and date back to 2019, among other things. In the meantime, the idea of removing the image of Ararat from the coat of arms has been considered. It is now expected that the Prime Minister will uphold the Turkish complaint from 100 years ago about Ararat on the coat of arms, which the then People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Georgi Chicherin, countered with an ironic reference to the red crescent on the Turkish side, and remove Ararat.

A well-known phrase from the discourse on memory is: "Those who do not remember their past are condemned to repeat it" (Assmann & Hölscher 1988, backcover) In order to remember the past, a memory is required which, according to Benjamin, "is not an instrument for exploring the past, but rather a medium. It is the medium of what has been experienced, just as the earth is the medium in which ancient cities lie buried" (Benjamin, 1932). If elements of the past can be uncovered in this way, they can also be buried the same. There is no culture without also producing barbarism (Benjamin, 1977, 254). The events on New Year's Day 23/24 follow on from the section on 24.4.22 in Washington and complete the alleged degradation of the Armenian Apostolic Church.

New Year 2023/2024

On New Year's Day 2023/24, state television refused to broadcast the usual speech by the Catholicos, which was linked to the broadcast of the political leader's New Year's address.

The addition of a speech by the representative of the Church to the speech of the head of state - without a bill - symbolizes a significant change compared to the time before: the certain participation of the Church in the political system of the republic. In the Soviet era, the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the USSR addressed their greetings to the population on TV and radio in Moscow at around midnight (Lane 1981:138). In Soviet Armenia, the First Party Secretary spoke. Of course, there was no sign of a representative of the Church. Now, however, a speech by a representative of the Church was added. The custom that emerged with independence can be linked to Armenia's national self-image as a Christian nation. This connection, which is inherent to Armenian society, is cut by the state measure, which, from a historical point of view, would be reminiscent of a method of the

Soviet era itself. Together with the events at the turn of the year, we can read what the Premier said about May 1 and 9.

We can add a symbolizing sentence to Pashinyan's May Day speech: "Work is the source of all wealth". In doing so, Pashinyan links the concept of work to the individual, whereby he probably also unspokenly includes the individual's personal environment. Support from religion and its artifacts are eliminated. There is no reference to trade unions that would institutionally represent the position and situation of the individual in their working environment – historical reasons for this cannot be discussed here. (f.e. Nazaretian & Busch 2017).

Instead, Pashinyan refers to laws and regulations as well as a "caring and knowledgeable relationship between employers and employees." (Pashinyan, 2024a). Pashinyan assumes labor as a historical given, but at no point does he mention its conditions. The view of work as an economic factor for people changes, but work remains the same. The difference is that work used to restrict the freedom of the individual, but today its conditions should provide happiness, freedom and well-being in order to "give [people] the opportunity to live freely, even to travel far" (Pashinyan, 2024b).

To the paradigm of "work", Pashinyan assigns or subordinates the economic man who fills it out, who utilitarian and egoistic – in the Armenian way - performs his work for the fatherland, which Pashinyan again begins in four sentences with an identical half-sentence, invokes: "The state is the fatherland..." and demands from the individual love for the state, taxes, improvement of education.

If these conditions are to be described as part of the worldwide Armenian nation, then the sole emphasis on the economic factor, for example, which of course exists, is an inadmissible reductionism; we should remember the meaning of mythomoteur, which is not exhausted by the meaning of economy.

In his New Year's address, Pashinyan thanks all the people who worked in 2023, increased the value and paid the taxes imposed by law. Almost like a mantra, Pashinyan formulates the achievements made by citizens in three sentences, each beginning with the half-sentence "It is thanks to the people ...": Creativity in the workplace, payment of taxes, minimum pension, general increase in productivity.

The topic of Artsakh is missing as a directly addressed aspect of the past year. Instead, it appears as a negative point in the annual balance: Feelings of pain are contrasted with pride. There is a lot of pain, but it is also New Year. The status of the martyr is standardized by their commitment to the state, for example in the speech on 9 May. Pashinyan wants to posthumously domesticate the martyrs of Artsakh economically by reinterpreting their fate in favour of value creation. The topic of Karabakh does not appear at all in the May 9 speech, so there is no celebration of a holiday that could have anything to do with Artsakh. It is

historicized and discarded. Those who fled are integrated in such a way that subjectively only his own memory of Karabakh remains, possibly materialized by the last passport in his personal chest of drawers. His attitude towards the “refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh (not ‘Artsakh’)” is expressed particularly succinctly at one point. He apologizes to everyone, the citizens of the country and those from Artsakh, for the “torment of recent years”, but he does not admit personal guilt, either for any crime or irresponsibility, but because he knows how they feel, he feels like them. Consequently, he apologizes to people for their feelings. Baku as a possible addressee of guilt is not addressed.

For all his empathy, Pashinyan refers to his duties as head of state who derives all his decisions and actions from the state interests of the Republic of Armenia. For Pashinyan, these state interests coagulate into a “thing in itself”. He serves the interests of the state, which seem to face us all. However, as he himself makes clear, he embodies these state interests personally!

This is meeting with increasing resistance among the population. Not only the losses are being criticized, but also how the government is dealing with them. Government policy has driven a wedge into society. The “Tawush crisis” was the trigger for a counter-movement that is being stylized as old versus new, but which seems logical in terms of system theory.

The Countermovement

In April/May, the long-standing protest against the government grew louder. The reason for a growing protest movement was Pashinyan's decision to return four villages in the province of Tavush on the border with Azerbaijan. These are villages that were taken from the Armenian side at the beginning of the 1990s. This fact is taken into account by the protesters. However, they criticize the fact that the government is unilaterally handing over land without, for example, asking the Azerbaijani side to vacate occupied areas in Armenia itself.

The current movement and its leader, Srbazan Bagrat, launched a protest from Tavush to the capital on May 9, a day steeped in history, to be on Republic Square to call on Pashinyan to resign. Strategically, this is reminiscent of Pashinyan himself, who famously began his march on Yerevan from Gyumri. Pashinyan came from the west, the cleric and his followers from the east. The result is a peculiar series of diametrically opposed oppositions. The movement started its march on Yerevan from the eastern province of Tavush, while Pashinyan began his from Gyumri. On 1 June, the counter-movement, led by the clergyman, organized a rally in Gyumri's Theatre Square. Thus, the conflict between the government and the opposition focused on the city, which is considered to be the beginning of the so-called Velvet Revolution. Equivalent to these opposites in their spatial dimensions is a temporal dimension, which for Pashinyan is reflected in the contrast between the present and the past. He and his government embody real thinking as opposed to what he calls the traumatic or historical thinking of the opposition from the church and diaspora.

If we consider the events described on April 24, 2022 in Washington and mark them on an axis on which the PM demarcates the Republic of Armenia from the Church and the diaspora, keeping them outside, so to speak, the diaspora and the Church push back onto the national, political terrain of the Republic via the dispute over the villages in Tavush, which we were able to observe on Tsitsernakabert on April 24 and Republic Square on May 9. Here I will focus on the events at Tsitserbakabert.

On the 109th anniversary of the genocide, posters of protest could be seen on Tsitsernakaberd Hill (Civil.net, 2024a). On them were demands such as: “We demand the immediate release of Armenian prisoners in Baku”, “There can be no peace agreement without releasing Armenian prisoners”, or “No to genocide” are slogans directed against their own government.

When evaluating the event at Tsitsernakabert, we must also bear in mind its origin, history and use. It cannot simply be attributed to past, yesterday's traditions. If we take into account that Pashinyan uses 24.4. as an occasion to characterize the content, which we can characterize above as mythomoteur, as the result of trauma, then on Tsitsernakabert he is confronted with a living political procession, this characteristic is also genuinely inscribed in the monument, even if the signs may change.



Bagrat during a rally (photo: Naira Zohrabyan)

When I saw the picture for the first time, I identified the person of Bagrat with Khorenatsi in the flesh, who had just come from the 5th century and saved a few pages from “HP” for the present day.

In a self-characterization, the “Tavush for the Fatherland” movement claims to have developed into a pan-Armenian movement. “It is above the aspirations of the political parties and has an exclusively national character. The ruling political power is not authorized to solve national problems in this way without discussion and taking into account the will of the people. Armenia is the motherland of us all, so we all have a responsibility. The moment is fateful, it is treason to give up the country, to lose the motherland” (verelq, 2024). These characteristics form the basis for what stands for entity and tripolarity above. It is evident here which concept of nation is being assumed - the national character is per se *azgajin*, which applies worldwide. The self-characterization can also be read from the point of view of the churchman Bagrat, when he concludes from the exclusively national character of the entity “Armenian nation” to its parts, which is not exhausted in the desired identity of nation, territory and people. Accordingly, the PM cannot speak for all Armenians, as he starts from a reduced concept of “nation”. The emergent network of tensions between diasporas and heartland is one of the inner components of the entity and cannot be torn apart by decree. This is all the more true if one takes a look at the genesis of the Armenian Apostolic Church.

Excursus: The Origin of the Armenian Apostolic Church

In order to gain insight into the fundamental character of the Armenian Apostolic Church, I would like to refer to the (indirect) discussion between the late German theologian Herrmann Goltz (University of Halle) and director of the Johannes Lepsius Archive and the historian of Armenian origin Nina Garsoian (Gispert, 2022, pp102ff). For Garsoian, “...l'Eglise nationale arménienne s'engageait pour longtemps sur une voie individuelle et essentiellement solitaire” (Goltz 2005: 392). Goltz writes that this would be true for the Armenian Church in its hierarchical and dogmatic size, but not if it were described as “essentially solitary”. Goltz, on the other hand, characterizes the Armenian Church as a “cultural star of the first magnitude” and emphasizes its “strongly communicative character, and not only in relation to Byzantium or Roman-Greek culture [...]” (Goltz, 2005, 393).

This means that if we take the metaphor of the star and its rays and sharpen it further, it will then reach beyond the church's own (institutional) boundaries and be correspondingly attractive for the environment beyond the border. This communicative characteristic is relevant in both morphogenetic and morphostatic terms. When Bagrat was preparing to run for the post of MP during the movement's phase of activity, he resigned from his church offices beforehand in order to let them rest. As a clergyman, he takes on secular tasks, precisely the historically

traditional educational mission that may also be expressed in my interpretation of the image of Bagrat. Within the social system, the Armenian Apostolic Church is its supporting, important component with its own sphere, relative to the political environment. Garsoian also sees this (Garsoian, 2004, 84). However, the church can be explained less as an individual or solitary entity - it lacks the communicative character that constitutes the balance between the church system and its environment, if we think of the emergence of the scripture or Komitas' failed attempt to wrest the Armenian notation system from the soil of oblivion. Neither was possible without communication with the foreign.

We can immediately apply the knowledge gained from this to the events at Tsiterbakaberd. With regard to the official assessment of April 24, relations have changed. This has an effect on the events on the hill. A different choreography is taking place. One example is the graves with fallen soldiers that were added during the First Karabakh War. While the memorial previously represented itself as an outwardly exhibited unity of architecture and its use by the people involved, it now rumbles inside: To keep it a little pathetic, the Karabakh graves are directed at and against the government and its policies. "No to genocide" directs the ideal content of the graves against government policy as a demand and reminder of what was also the reason for the first Karabakh war: to create the conditions to prevent genocide. However, 30 years later, the time had come and over a hundred thousand people were expelled by Aliyev.

The process of successive exclusion and the reinterpretation of the graves both at Tsitserakabert and implicitly at Sardarapat continues in the reactions of well-known representatives of the clergy. Bishop Barkev, for example, imagines a renewed Sardarapat: "Today, as a nation, we are experiencing our fateful Sardarapat once again" (<https://168.am/2024/05/08/2040698.html>). This brings us to the thought that there is no redemption from all this and that it seems to come to endless repetitions, which brings us back to the motif of repetition in the structure of the cross stone itself.

However, what is believed to be seen repeatedly is not what is experienced identically: "It is not that the past casts its light on the present or the present casts its light on the past, but the image is that in which the past and the present come together in a flash to form a constellation" (Benjamin cf. Pethes n.d.: 13). In this sense, Barkev has struck such a lightning-like constellation.

This insight is to be made fruitful for our purposes. Supporters of government policy see in the movement a symbol of the "depth of the past" as a guideline for the future. The movement is historical Armenia, whereas Pashinyan's policies represent the supposedly "real Armenia", which sees itself as synonymous with the future (Damjan Krnjevic-Miskovic 2024).

If we take the above quote and apply it to the critics of the movement, we see that its protagonists cast their light one-sidedly on the past and are unaware of the shadows that arise in the process, as the necessary communication between church and state is missing or neglected. There is no flash.

Ultimately, Artsakh is also seen by the government's supporters as a secessionist entity that came to an end in 2020 and effectively ceased to exist on September 28, 2023. In principle, the Turkish-Azerbaijani argument is being adopted by the government and its supporters. Just one week later, Pashinyan, together with the President of the European Council Michel and French President Macron as well as German Chancellor Scholz, issued a statement in which Armenia pledged "unwavering support" for territorial integrity and the inviolability of the border. The statement also says something about the relationship between Armenia and Turkey, which is supposed to normalize. Pashinyan is aiming for EU membership, which should be noted here. What seems astonishing is the short period of time between the expulsion of the Armenians from Artsakh and the statement. One week after the mass exodus, the expulsion, which must be classified as genocide, a meeting is held to approve a joint program. The time seems too short to guarantee conception and implementation.

When discussing human rights, territorial integrity and the right to self-determination, the following questions must always be asked: Where are they applied and how? Ethical values are set against the material value of money, which is measured by the deposits of raw materials to be captured and exploited. Azerbaijan has already captured, now it is time to exploit. In this context, the fact that Azerbaijan has not recaptured Artsakh becomes more important. Azerbaijan has illegally conquered Artsakh, it has never owned Artsakh. This is interesting because, legally speaking, Azerbaijan is occupying foreign territory. The raw material interests behind this, which are of course in Euro-American interests, give rise to thoughts of colonialism. An Azerbaijani government report on "Economic Minerals" in Nagorno-Karabakh shows that 350 deposits of critical raw materials have been found there, for example copper and cobalt. One month after the conquest of Karabakh, Mukhtar Babayev, the country's Minister of Environment and Natural Resources, invites visitors to "GeoMining Baku" - the first mining trade fair in Azerbaijan. (daserste.de) German companies were also in attendance. A practical consequence of the ethnic cleansing that had taken place shortly before, which must be read together with genocide. The handling of human rights is scrutinized economically in terms of its efficiency for the project, which may lead to the bending of the law. A further event is a description of the problem, as well.

"At an event organized on March 6, 2024 in Berlin by the German Council on Foreign Relations and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, a book that had just come out of print was to be presented, offering the latest research findings on the culture and history of Artsakh.

The organizers were put under pressure in the form of threats, mass emails, phone calls, etc.. The Berlin Senate and the city of Berlin did not want to provide security for the event. Between Berlin and Baku, the Azerbaijani embassy was the focal point of these actions.

The entire process and its outcome can be counted by the Azerbaijani side as part of the rich harvest of years of successful influencing of European parliamentarians and members of the Council of Europe, which in Germany goes under the code "caviar diplomacy".

For the time being, we can summarize at this point: In the course of the effect of heteronomous processes, the autonomous spheres of the political and the scientific dissolve. The scientific is increasingly permeated by the political, as we can also witness in Armenia. The controversy over the history textbook for the 7th grade or the university reform sought by Pashinyan, which would be tantamount to eliminating the academy, may serve as a reference. To a certain extent, March 6 represents the culmination of developments that create dependencies, which have a direct impact on the education sector, among other things, and which, see Berlin, Baku and Yerevan, are intended to rewrite history.

The Armenian Nation as a Utopian Entity a Clue to the Origin of Bridge¹

In particular, the qualification of the de facto state of Artsakh as the result of a secessionist movement leads us back to the programmatic identification of border, territory, nation and citizen.

The term *azgajin* should be contrasted with this. It should be remembered here that *azgajin* both contains and transcends the territorially arbitrary, historical borders of the Armenian nation. In this regard, it should also be remembered that everything in a foreign language was translated into Armenian as far as possible, and *azg/azgajin* was found for '*nation*'. This means that this Armenian word both represents and transcends the native equivalent of '*nation*'.

¹ I would like to take this opportunity to thank Levon Abrahamyan in particular for his critical comments that led to this section.

The impossibility of a 1:1 identity of *nation* and *azg* is also an expression of the interweaving of diaspora and homeland, i.e. the tripolar character of the Armenian nation as an entity within a multidimensional time-space relationship.

Various aspects of the border phenomenon emerge here. The historically evolved construct of diaspora and Armenian church is subordinated to the politically predetermined formation of an identity of border, territory, nation and people living there. As a “re-action” (Nietzsche, Benjamin) to this, the movement of a clergyman emerges, who intends to restore the political role of the Armenian Apostolic Church in the structure of an Armenian nation of tripolar order.

As an emergent phenomenon in terms of system theory, the Bagrat movement can be described as an indicator of an imaginary demarcation vis-à-vis the state, whose government wants to draw a supposedly actually existing ethnic border. The two do not coincide, but are mutually dependent in their emergence. The difference concerns the utopian content that is genuinely inherent to the Armenian nation and which is not exhausted by the aforementioned identification.

How does this explain Bagrat's grouping and his conflict with the government? Clearly and obviously, as can be seen, it is a sign of the past for the government. The opposite can be seen from the perspective of a non-assimilated diaspora Armenian. For him, life in the diaspora is life in a homeland that is foreign; the imagined homeland, because it is generally foreign, is in this sense the Armenian heartland. The Diaspora Armenian does not relate to this heartland as his homeland, but as a Diaspora Armenian in the aforementioned tripolarity. We therefore have completely different possible lines of conflict here, which cannot be resolved by reducing them to a bipolarity. Bagrat's claim regarding Artsakh cannot be reduced to a complaint about lost soil, because *azgayin* by its very nature transcends soil as pure matter.

The network of diaspora, church and heartland, i.e. the present-day Republic of Armenia, contains numerous lines of demarcation, which can also be described as lines of conflict, which are complexly linked to the South Caucasus region alone. The picture becomes even more complex if we take into account the period since the fall of the Iron Curtain, for example the associated flows of refugees from the Republic and Artsakh.

Benyamin Poghosyan, a geopolitical expert and researcher at the Applied Research Policy Institute of Armenia, describes the South Caucasus as a "microcosm of the multilateral world order", whereby he understands multilateralism to mean networked world politics. (krautreporter.de 2024). If we take the Armenian nation as the above-mentioned entity and include it in this model, then it is to be understood as an indispensable historical part of this global

network; however, the history and character of the Armenian diaspora show that, in terms of memory politics, the Republic of Armenia as a nominal homeland, as a centre alone, does not sufficiently describe the Armenian ethnic group.

What Poghosyan calls the importance of Armenia's geography, Abrahamyan extends to the phenomenon of coincidence: "Armenians always seem to appear on the border between East and West. This coincidence is such a constant in the course of history that one is even tempted to call it "the fate of the Armenians", or at least to take this phenomenon into account when classifying the characteristics of Armenianness" (Abrahamyan, 2005, 347).

We can use **azgayin** for "Armenianness" and relate it to the global political network. The network metaphor, in turn, implies a simultaneity of the elements that make it up and act within it, and that is particularly important with regard to the ideological evaluation of the Diaspora and the Church.

Taking into account the global political integration of Armenia as a border region and an area of influence reached by foothills, the following statement by Poghosyan on the aspect of the geopolitical situation is helpful: "In Armenia, we often describe ourselves as prisoners of geography", which is a more accurate way of describing the important role of geography. It should be added that the term "prisoner" is too passive, it could lead to a corresponding image of victimisation. If we attribute such an important role to Armenia's geography, how can Armenia's relationship to it be expressed more "actively"? There is also the phenomenon of believing oneself to be both an active and a passive object.

A historical example of this, which still has an impact today, is Jugha in Armenian Nakhijevan. In 1604, the Persian Shah Abbas took Armenians back to Persia and founded New Jugha in order to manifest a new west-east border, "[...] Jugha, a city in Armenia, which was a flourishing trade center in the 16th century. When the Persian king Shah Abbas decided to move the borderline between East and West toward his country, he accomplished this by destroying Jugha, the former intermediary point between East and West, and moving its population to Persia in the beginning of the 17th century to found New Jugha, which soon became a new intermediary point between East and West" (Abrahamjan 2005:347).

Another example is the Indian Company of the British Empire, which encountered Armenians there during its conquest of India; Armenians acted as intermediaries for it (Abrahamyan, 2005, 345).

In the case of Jugha, the Armenians were forced to migrate in order to work as intermediaries in Persia; they were already in India to take orders from the conquerors. The historical connections between Armenia and India have recently come to the surface again, considering Azerbaijan's war with Armenia, where India became an important supplier of arms to Armenia. On the other hand, India has to

fight a dispute with Pakistan, which in turn maintains friendly relations with Azerbaijan (krautreporter.de) and also made this known during the last Karabakh war in 2020.

So we have two analogous pairs of opposites acting simultaneously on the network map in different places with Armenian participation. The current Iran-Israel conflict also connects regionally to the Armenia-Azerbaijan opposition pair. Azerbaijan supplies oil and money to Israel, in return for which it receives weapons. It is argued that the weapons are directed against Iran, but are in fact also used by Azerbaijan against Armenia.

The complex mixture in which Armenia is integrated is part of a geographical north-south line between Moscow, Tbilisi, Yerevan and Tehran on the one hand and a west-east line via Turkey-Armenia-Azerbaijan on the other, whereby from the above example Pakistan and India could be seen as easily connected (<http://www.deutscharmenischegesellschaft.de>, 2012).

Abrahamyan now presents a calculation according to which an important mediating role could be played in a western region with a large Armenian population – as a counterpart to the Republic of Armenia, so to speak – and finds it in the US state of California: “The increasing number of Asians living there provides visible ‘confirmation’ of such a possible future shift. The US trend since the 1980s to realize trade relations across the Pacific rather than the Atlantic (Hague, Harrop & Breslin, 1992, 116) also points in this direction. Thus, perhaps it will be the Armenian diaspora, with its internal structure of successive mediating components (including the Hayastants’ and all the other various old and new diaspora groups with their many levels of social and professional status), that could play an important role in establishing a new model of homeland-diaspora relations [...]” (Abrahamyan, 2005, 349).

Armenians act as mediators in this network, but also become the victims. Their own intermediary activity is also used as a political strategy (Abrahamyan 2005: 348f). The word intermediacy connotes the explanations given for the term “medium”. As a “bridge”, Armenia is not BETWEEN East and West, it is always in between West and East. Figuratively speaking, it is in constant exchange, in constant movement between East and West. For the role of mediator, this means that it cannot be limited locally to the Caucasian region with only one Armenian center.

This brings us back to the concept of the entity, as the multi-layered nature of the Armenian nation is expressed here, in that the diaspora and the heartland are juxtaposed and can be related to each other flexibly and on the same level.

In this way, we arrive at a more precise definition of what “origin of the bridge” means. In analyzing the genesis of the Tsitsernakabert genocide memorial, I came

across Foucault, who defines utopias as “placements without a real place that enter into a relationship of direct or inverted analogy with the real space of society” (Foucault, 1998, 38f). Social (political) reality seems to be reversed in the memorial ritual, the area coagulates into an “unreal space”. The commemorators celebrate a visionary commonality with the dead and ancestors in the round of the grave, abstracting from the space.

It is a multidimensional network of time and space that is stretched out here and, as Foucault describes, it is conceded to the given place in a different way than abandoned. The utopian content thus lies in the difference between the real, given place and the unreal place that coagulates from the interaction. It should also become clear that “bridge” cannot be fixed locally.

Conclusion

Armenia's geopolitical constellation with its consequences of death, flight, division and expulsion also seems to apply to the present day. The current government is striving to establish ties with the West and wants to free itself from Russian dependencies. In order to avoid the elaborate procedure on the pros and cons of betrayal of Armenia – from whichever side – I asked myself what the issue of Artsakh means for the government of Armenia. Thus I do not derive political action from the loss of Artsakh, but consider it as part of it. In doing so, I accept the loss and look at how this is reflected in government action. In doing so, we assume Artsakh as an open medium, i.e. as an entity in its own right, with a history before and after.

The current politics of memory in the Republic of Armenia attempts to cut ties to a past that recognizes the “Armenian nation” as an entity of a higher order. The cornerstone of this approach is the ideology of the identity of state, nation and territory as the only given entity. This is also one reason why Artsakh was dropped. It was therefore interesting to assume that the fate of Artsakh was part of a deliberately driven transformation process.

When analyzing the memorial days, it became clear that the current process seems to be a “hard change”, a rupture. The official policy amounts to a kind of diametrical confrontation:

Church/Diaspora: Past = East

Government: Presence and Futurre = West

In terms of content, the events in Washington (24.4.22) already contain all the elements that we are presented with on the occasion of other commemoration days.

Commemorative events such as the one in Washington symbolically express the prevailing dissent between the church/diaspora and the government, i.e. even before the physical loss of Artsakh. Attempts are being made to sell the historical task of the Armenian Apostolic Church in the present as one of the past, which must be written off economically. The measures taken by Pashinyan are part of a series of attempts by the Republic to harness the power of the diaspora more centrally. In Pashinyan's case, this approach undergoes a practical radicalization: while in 2018 he still spoke of a senate to be formed for the diaspora in the system to be reformed (Gispert 2018), it is now completely absent.

To a certain extent, Pashinyan previously wanted to centrally control the relationship with the diaspora, but now he has dropped it, as the question of recognition, for example, is not an issue for Pashinyan, and relationships of an economic nature do not appear to be expedient here. In this regard, the speeches on April 24, May 1 and May 9 of this year should be singled out again. Here, the PM subordinates the fate of the murdered, the martyrs, to his new policy of remembrance: They are no longer the subject of traumatic conditions, but serve progress. The problem with this is that martyrs, especially when they are dead, react very sensitively to external influences such as ideological reburial as an exchange value. The problem is external to the martyrs, because “(t)he only identity that persists in the background through all war memorials (is) the identity of the dead with themselves...” (Kosselleck 1979:257), which means, among other things, that those “reburied” in this way are unable to defend themselves.

The government is striving for an economic reorientation of spirituality. Genocide is trauma, which must be overcome and is done through the (re)organization of work that helps people achieve happiness. This is the ostensible formula of the PM. Pashinyan curiously uses religious phrases when he invokes milk and honey for the native soil, something that one would otherwise expect from Echmiadzin. However, milk and honey must now combine with earthly labor in order to be promoted. Religion and its artifacts seem to have disappeared, replaced by the promise of luck-bringing work, from which, as described, the theme of Artsakh could only be derived negatively.

The counter-movement under the cleric Bagrat, which presents itself as the embodiment of the entity “Armenian nation” with history and past and has the claim to a higher order, while Pashinyan's entity wants to do without this.

In the sense of the explained interaction of morphostasis and morphogenesis of an entity, it must be seen to what extent the government program can close emerging gaps. If the hard change indicated here is form-changing, but without exceeding said limits, then the cause is part of the morphogenetic domain. If the modifications demanded by the government jeopardize the balance, the limits for

the morphostatic state of the unit have been exceeded. Then there is also a danger of dissolution. However, this would only affect the state structure of Armenia, not so much the Armenian Apostolic Church. The structural limits of the ranges of the type of entity “Armenian nation”, as the countermovement would like to represent it, are greater than those of the government, which assumes the identity of territory, state and nation. Here we abstract from the success or failure of the movement. The analysis of **khachkar** and the character of Church not only showed this, but also offered clues to the question of origins.

The assumption that the origin lies in the individual thought does not mean that the individual thought is the origin. This is partly due to the collective character of the individual thought. For with Halbwachs we know about its a priori existing multi-group membership. This fact turns the Berlin event into a kind of criminal grotesque with international participation: “Who or what was that?”, one might ask. If one wants to search for an origin of the failure in the case of March 6, for example, it is already problematic at the level of the German host country: Berlin-City, Berlin-Country, Berlin-State in connection with Azerbaijan result in manifold relationships among each other, which suggests a failure of the attempt to find an origin of the extent of the event, whereby purely legal questions are disregarded here. The Berlin event connotes the dual character of the Musa-Dagh book, in particular that of a piece of counter-history and topical commentary, which would not only apply to the circumstances of the event in Berlin. The book(s) could also be discussed as a piece of counter-history to Armenia's current politics of memory.

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43. In dem Beitrag werden konkrete Beispiele mit Texten und bestimmten Übungen zur Illustration des Einsatzes der Mehrsprachigkeitsdidaktik und Multikulturalität in den nationalen Schulbüchern vorgestellt. Das Erlernen einer Sprache geht mit dem Sichvertrautmachen mit der Kultur einher und enthält immer kulturbezogene Elemente.