

**Armen Ts. Marukyan**

Institute of History the Republic of Armenia

ORCID: 0009-0007-4926-0654

mararmts@yahoo.com

**LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DOCUMENTS SIGNED  
ON AUGUST 8, 2025, IN WASHINGTON BETWEEN ARMENIA AND  
AZERBAIJAN**

**Abstract**

After the 44-day Artsakh War in 2020 and especially the complete de-Armenization of Artsakh as a result of the further aggression unleashed by Azerbaijan in September 2023, the balance of power in the South Caucasus region radically changed. In the new realities, negotiations began on a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, within the framework of which the agreements reached were summarized in a document signed by the leaders of the two countries in Washington on August 8, 2025, under the witness of the US President.

This article provides a detailed analysis of the joint statement signed by Armenia and Azerbaijan, the initialed peace treaty, and the memorandum of understanding on the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group. The negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia on the provisions of the document initialed in Washington, as well as the packages of proposals submitted to each other, are also discussed.

The aim of the article is to demonstrate, through a substantive analysis of the mentioned documents, the significance of both them and the TRIPP project in establishing real peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and ensuring stability and development in the South Caucasus region.

**Key words** - Armenia, Azerbaijan, USA, Artsakh, negotiations, «peace» agreement, Minsk Group, TRIPP project.

**ՀԱՅԱՍՏԱՆԻ ԵՎ ԱԴՐԲԵՋԱՆԻ ՄԻՋԵՎ ՎԱՇԻՆԳՏՈՆՈՒՄ  
2025 Թ. ՕԳՈՍՏՈՍԻ 8-ԻՆ ՍՏՈՐԱԳՐՎԱԾ ՓԱՍՏԱԹՂԹԵՐԻ  
ԻՐԱՎԱՔԱՂԱՔԱԿԱՆ ՎԵՐԼՈՒԾՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ**

**Ամփոփում**

2020 թ. 44-օրյա Արցախյան պատերազմի և հատկապես 2023 թ. սեպտեմբերին Ադրբեջանի կողմից սանձազերծված հերթական ագրեսիայի հետևանքով Արցախի ամբողջական հայաթափումից հետո Հարավային Կովկասի տարածաշրջանում ուժերի հավասարակշռությունը արմատապես փոխվեց: Նոր իրողության պայմաններում Ադրբեջանի և Հայաստանի միջև խաղաղության համաձայնագրի վերաբերյալ սկսվեցին բանակցություններ, որոնց շրջանակներում ձեռք բերված պայմանավորվածություններն ամփոփվեցին 2025 թ. օգոստոսի 8-ին Վաշինգտոնում ԱՄՆ-ի նախագահի վկայությամբ նախաստորագրված փաստաթղթում:

Սույն հոդվածում հանգամանորեն վերլուծվում են Հայաստանի և Ադրբեջանի միջև ստորագրված համատեղ հայտարարությունը, նախաստորագրված խաղաղության համաձայնագիրը և ԵԱՀԿ Մինսկի խումբը լուծարելու մասին փոխընթերցման հուշագիրը: Քննության են ենթարկվում նաև Վաշինգտոնում նախաստորագրված փաստաթղթի վերաբերյալ Ադրբեջանի և Հայաստանի միջև ընթացած բանակցությունները, միմյանց ներկայացրած առաջարկների փաթեթները:

Հոդվածի նպատակն է նշված փաստաթղթերի բովանդակային վերլուծության միջոցով ցույց տալ դրանց, ինչպես նաև ԹԻՓՓ նախագծի նշանակությունը Հայաստանի և Ադրբեջանի միջև իրական խաղաղության հաստատման ու Հարավային Կովկասի տարածաշրջանում կայունություն և զարգացում ապահովելու գործում:

**Բանալի բառեր**– Հայաստան, Ադրբեջան, ԱՄՆ, Արցախ, բանակցություններ, «խաղաղության» համաձայնագիր, Մինսկի խումբ, ԹԻՓՓ նախագիծ:

**ПОЛИТИКО-ПРАВОВОЙ АНАЛИЗ ДОКУМЕНТОВ,  
ПОДПИСАННЫХ РЕСПУБЛИКОЙ АРМЕНИЯ И  
АЗЕРБАЙДЖАНОМ 8 АВГУСТА 2025 ГОДА В ВАШИНГТОНЕ**

**Резюме**

После 44-дневной Арцахской войны 2020 г. и особенно полной деарменизации Арцаха в результате очередной агрессии Азербайджана в сентябре 2023 г., баланс сил в регионе Южного Кавказа радикально изменился. В новых условиях начались переговоры по мирному соглашению между Азербайджаном и Арменией, в рамках которых были достигнуты договоренности, которые зафиксированы в документе, подписанном лидерами двух стран в Вашингтоне 8 августа 2025 г. в присутствии президента США.

В данной статье подробно анализируются совместное заявление, подписанное между Арменией и Азербайджаном, предварительно согласованный мирный договор, а также меморандум о взаимопонимании по вопросу роспуска Минской группы ОБСЕ. Рассматриваются тексты документов по переговорам между Арменией и Азербайджаном, проходившие вокруг предварительно согласованной в Вашингтоне договоренности, а также пакеты взаимных предложений, представленных обеими сторонами.

Цель статьи – с помощью проведения контент-анализа выявить значение согласованных документов и проекта ТРИПП в деле обеспечения реального мира между Арменией и Азербайджаном, стабильности и развития в регионе Южного Кавказа.

**Ключевые слова:** Армения, Азербайджан, США, Арцах, переговоры, «мирное» соглашение, Минская группа, проект ТРИПП.

**Introduction**

In 2020, after the 44-day Artsakh War, Azerbaijan tried to force the Armenian side to sign a peace treaty on favorable terms with a show of military force and the threat of a new war, something that Armenian diplomacy was unable to force on Azerbaijan after the victory in the first Artsakh War. The first step taken in this direction was that on March 11, 2022, Azerbaijan handed over to the Armenian

side the «5 Principles» for the normalization of relations, which were in fact not the basis for the normalization of relations with Armenia and the signing of the so-called «peace» treaty, but rather preconditions imposed on Armenia. They were reminiscent of the demands put forward by official Ankara in the 1990s, before diplomatic relations were established between Armenia and Turkey. A long-term process of exchanging mutual proposals between the parties around these «rinciples» sent by Azerbaijan to Armenia, which ultimately led to the initialing of the agreed document under the witness of the US President at the White House on August 8, 2025.

## 1. Negotiations on the provisions of the «peace» treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia

The first of the «principles» put forward by Azerbaijan was the absence of territorial claims towards each other and the commitment not to make such claims in the future, which implied that Armenia should refuse to raise the issues of the right of self-determination of the Armenians of Artsakh and the sovereignty of the Republic of Artsakh.

Baku proposed to refrain from threatening each other's security, threats against political independence and territorial integrity, and the use of force in interstate relations (МИД Азербайджана огласил 5 принципов нормализации связей с Арменией, <https://www.aa.com.tr/ru/2534649>), in the event that it was he who consistently carried out the aforementioned aggressive actions against the republics of Artsakh and Armenia. In this way, the Azerbaijani side was trying to play on the issue of forces with so-called «revanchist» aspirations in Armenia, posing such conditions to the Armenian side that no attempt would be made to restore the territorial integrity of the Republic of Artsakh or return the territories occupied by Armenia and restore the previous features.

In one of the «principles» conveyed to the Armenian side, Azerbaijan proposed to delimit and demarcate the Azerbaijani-Armenian state border without making any commitment to withdraw its armed forces from the territories occupied by Armenia before that. Through this «principle», Azerbaijan was trying to create a «legal» basis for the strategically important territories occupied by Azerbaijan from Armenia as a result of the May 2021 aggression.

The last «principle» of the Azerbaijani proposals concerned the opening of transport and communication routes (МИД Азербайджана огласил 5 принципов нормализации связей с Арменией, <https://www.aa.com.tr/ru/2534649>), by which Baku primarily meant the creation of a land connection through the so-called

«Zangezur corridor» not only with the regions of Artsakh and Nakhichevan occupied by Azerbaijan, but also with Turkey, which would be one of the first serious steps towards the implementation of the pan-Turanian program.

On March 14, Armenia sent response proposals to Baku, stating that Armenia has never had and does not have territorial claims against Azerbaijan, referring to the Declaration on the Establishment of the CIS signed by Armenia in Alma-Ata on December 21, 1991, jointly with the former republics of the USSR, including Azerbaijan, whereby the newly proclaimed states mutually recognized each other's territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders (Алма-Атинская Декларация 21.12.1991). In this regard, it is important to note that the representatives of the Armenian side involved in the negotiations for the adoption of the Alma-Ata Declaration record that Armenia signed and ratified the declaration on the creation of the CIS with certain reservations. The 10th of them actually envisaged the possibility of Nagorno-Karabakh joining the CIS. The wording of the reservation clause made it clear that it was referring to «Nagorno-Karabakh», although it was not mentioned in the text<sup>1</sup>. As is known, Nagorno-Karabakh had the status of an «autonomous formation» - an autonomous region - within the USSR and declared its independence through a referendum on December 10, 1991, 16 days before the declaration «On the cessation of the existence of the USSR» adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on December 26. Let us add that Azerbaijan ratified the Alma-Ata Declaration in 1993 and only since then has it joined the CIS, which is also of significant importance in terms of clarifying Azerbaijan's borders. Without emphasizing these important circumstances for the republics of Armenia and Artsakh, the mention of the Alma-Ata Declaration solely in terms of having no claims to the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan stems exclusively from Baku's interests.

In the third point, Armenia addressed the issues of guaranteeing the security of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, respecting their rights and freedoms, as well as determining the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh (Հայաստանի համար հիմնարար է ԼՂ վերջնական կարգավիճակի հարցը. հրապարակվել են հայկական կողմի ներկայացրած 6 կետերը,

---

<sup>1</sup> According to the 10th reservation made by Armenia regarding the content of the declaration, in the paragraph that states that the document is open for accession to all member states of the USSR, after the words «open for accession to all states of the USSR», it was proposed to add the words «including for the former autonomous formations of the USSR, which, before the adoption of the Declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR «On the Termination of the Existence of the USSR», held a national referendum on the declaration of independence, and on the basis of this, the highest executive body of the autonomous formation will apply to the CIS with a request to be admitted to its composition». (Զոլյան, <https://www.pastinfo.am/hy/news/2022/10/19/6v5dy8lae/1478229>)

<https://armenpress.am/arm/news/1083187.html>), but it was not made absolutely clear what status Armenia had in mind for Nagorno-Karabakh or what mechanism it was proposing for resolving the issue.

The fourth point implied that Azerbaijan continued to fail to fulfill its obligations under the trilateral statement of November 9/10, 2020, regarding the return of all prisoners of war and the opening of communication channels (Հայաստանի համար հիմնարար է ԼՂ վերջնական կարգավիճակի հարցը. հրապարակվել են հայկական կողմի ներկայացրած 6 կետերը, <https://armenpress.am/arm/news/1083187.html>). From the vague wording of this point, it can be concluded that the Armenian side did not view it as a precondition for starting negotiations, but simply as a statement of fact.

The fifth point expressed a willingness to begin negotiations with Azerbaijan on a peace and normalization agreement based on the UN Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Helsinki Final Act, which makes it clear that, unlike Azerbaijan, Armenia did not set any preconditions for starting negotiations.

Finally, the sixth point stated that Armenia would appeal to the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs to organize negotiations with Azerbaijan to conclude a peace treaty (Հայաստանի համար հիմնարար է ԼՂ վերջնական կարգավիճակի հարցը. հրապարակվել են հայկական կողմի ներկայացրած 6 կետերը, <https://armenpress.am/arm/news/1083187.html>). With this point, the Armenian side seemed to be trying to revive the Minsk Group, but in the conditions of the Russia-West confrontation in Ukraine, the relaunch of this format was unrealistic, since, first of all, the OSCE Minsk Group Presidency is not endowed with the mandate to organize negotiations for the signing of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan and, without the consent and clear application of the parties, cannot assume such powers. The problem was complicated by the fact that after the success achieved in the Artsakh war in 2020 with the support of Turkey, Azerbaijan generally rejected that format. It is no coincidence that the «3+3» format was put forward as an alternative to the Minsk Group, which, in addition to Russia, also included Turkey and Iran as regional powers, excluding the participation of Western countries. Several meetings were convened in this format, but Georgia's non-participation cast doubt on its prospects.

After a three-month pause in the negotiation process and the de-Armenization of the three Armenian settlements of the Berdzor (Lachin) corridor - Berdzor, Aghavno, and Sus - as a result of the August attack by Azerbaijan, and the change in the only route connecting the Republic of Artsakh to the Republic of Armenia, on August 31, 2022, a regular meeting of the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan was held in Brussels

under the mediation of the President of the European Council of the EU, Charles Michel.

The combination of the statement released by the Armenian side after the negotiations and the texts of Michel's statement allows us to at least get a rough idea of the content of the issues under discussion. In particular, Michel's statement emphasized that an agreement had been reached to intensify work on advancing a peace treaty regulating interstate relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the foreign ministers were instructed to organize a meeting within a month to work on draft documents. Unlike Michel's May statement, the new text no longer uses the phrases «Nagorno-Karabakh» and «Karabakh conflict» (Press statement by President Ch. Michel following the trilateral meeting with President of Azerbaijan and Prime Minister of Armenia, 31 August 2022, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/08/31/>).

It was noteworthy that in the statement released by the Armenian side, the issue of normalizing Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and «issues related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict» were already separated. This circumstance gave grounds to assume that Armenia seemed to have retreated from the position it had adopted over the past six months. The separation of the so-called «peace» treaty with Azerbaijan and the Artsakh issue was exclusively in the interests of Azerbaijan and contained serious dangers for the two Armenian states, since it was obvious that, having achieved its goal and signed a corresponding document with Armenia, Azerbaijan would no longer have any interest in negotiating with the latter on the Artsakh issue.

Michel's statement, which included the release of Armenian prisoners of war and other forcibly detained persons held in Azerbaijan, as well as the lifting of the blockade of transport links, among the points of the trilateral statement, indicated that the European Union was trying to deprive Russia of the results of the agreements reached on these issues through the latter's mediation in several trilateral documents, to which official Moscow reacted quite harshly.

Contrary to the agreements reached, Azerbaijan launched another aggression against the Republic of Armenia on September 13, 2022, as a result of which, according to official data, another 10 km<sup>2</sup> of territory was seized from the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia (**Մարտիանյան**, <https://hetq.am/hy/article/148314>). It was after this attack that, under the joint mediation of President of France E. Macron and EU European Council President Ch. Michel, the next meeting of the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan was organized in Prague on October 6, as a result of which the parties confirmed their commitment to the UN Charter and the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration, through which they allegedly mutually recognized each other's territorial integrity (Statement following quadrilateral meeting between President Aliyev, Prime Minister Pashinyan, President Macron and President Michel, 6 October

2022, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/10/07/>). Once again, the Armenian side referred to the Alma-Ata Declaration without mentioning the 10th reservation, which gave Azerbaijan the opportunity to interpret the declaration exclusively based on its own interests, including the Republic of Artsakh within the framework of its principle of territorial integrity.

The parties agreed that these documents would serve as the basis for the work of the commission on border demarcation issues, the next session of which was to be held in Brussels by the end of October (Statement following quadrilateral meeting between President Aliyev, Prime Minister Pashinyan, President Macron and President Michel, 6 October 2022, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/10/07/>). In this issue, there was a clear desire on the part of the EU, and in particular France, to take charge of the process of delimitating the Azerbaijani-Armenian border, the foundation of which was laid with the trilateral statement adopted on November 26, 2021, with the mediation of Russia.

Armenia agreed to host a EU civilian mission to monitor the border with Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan agreed to cooperate with the mission insofar as it is relevant to it (Statement following quadrilateral meeting between President Aliyev, Prime Minister Pashinyan, President Macron and President Michel, 6 October 2022, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/10/07/>). The sending of this EU mission should also be viewed in the context of creating an alternative to the CSTO observer group monitoring the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, which was also perceived very negatively by Russia, which had made mediation efforts in this matter.

In the context of these EU initiatives to take the process of normalizing relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia into its own hands, it was entirely expected that Russia, which had made considerable efforts in that process, would try to reassert its primary role. The last meeting of the leaders of the three countries - Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia - took place in Sochi on October 31, 2022, as a result of which, with the fourth joint statement adopted, the parties reaffirmed the commitments of the previous three joint statements adopted in the trilateral format (Заявление Президента Азербайджанской Республики, Премьер-министра Республики Армения и Президента Российской Федерации, <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5860>).

It was of fundamental importance for Russia that, in the fourth joint statement, the parties once again emphasized the key contribution of the Russian peacekeeping contingent to stabilizing the situation in the region and ensuring security. It is noteworthy, however, that the area of activity of Russian peacekeepers is not mentioned as Nagorno-Karabakh, as was stated in the text of the first trilateral statement, but in a vague manner – «deployment zone» (Заявление Президента Азербайджанской Республики, Премьер-министра Республики Армения и Президента Российской Федерации, <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5860>). Once

again, the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1991 was interpreted exclusively in a context beneficial to Azerbaijan, and the parties agreed to refrain from the use of force or the threat of its use, and expressed their willingness to discuss and resolve all problematic issues exclusively on the basis of mutual recognition of sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders, in accordance with the UN Charter and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1991 (Заявление Президента Азербайджанской Республики, Премьер-министра Республики Армения и Президента Российской Федерации, <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5860>).

The document mentions the need to conclude a peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia and carry out preparatory work towards it, which was considered important from the point of view of achieving stable and long-term peace in the region. Russia, for its part, reaffirmed its commitment, made in the trilateral statement of November 26, 2021, to provide advisory assistance to the parties on the delimitation and demarcation of borders, taking into account the provision of maps stored at the Russian General Staff. Official Moscow was probably addressing this point to the EU, since the documents adopted during the meetings organized through the latter's mediation also spoke about providing assistance in the issues of delimitation and demarcation of the borders of Azerbaijan and Armenia (Заявление Президента Азербайджанской Республики, Премьер-министра Республики Армения и Президента Российской Федерации, <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5860>).

The main goal of the regular meeting of the leaders of the three countries in Sochi was that Russia was trying to make it clear to the EU, and in particular France, as well as to Azerbaijan and Armenia, that it had not given up its role in the settlement process.

Thus, in the conditions of Russia-West competition and confrontation, Azerbaijan's periodic military aggressions and uncompromising stance on the one hand, and the inconsistent, often concessionary position of the Armenian side on the other, led to such transformations in the process of resolving the Artsakh issue that the diplomatic documents adopted and published during the negotiations contained points and formulations that were predominantly in the interests of Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan, at the instigation of Turkey, was in a hurry to make the most of the advantage it gained as a result of the 2020 Artsakh war, fully aware that if it missed the favorable period for it and the situation changed, it might not have such an opportunity again. The Armenian side tried in every way to delay the final resolution of the issue and gain time, but in the process of regulating relations with Azerbaijan, as well as the Artsakh issue, the steps to maneuver between the mediations and proposals of Moscow, Washington, and Brussels were carried out with unprofessional, situational solutions, which resulted in new territorial and human losses for both the Republic of Artsakh and the Republic of Armenia.

The diplomatic mistakes and unilateral concessions of the Armenian side created favorable conditions for Azerbaijan to make its policy towards Artsakh more radical. Baku first kept the Armenian population under blockade for about 10 months by closing the Berdzor (Lachin) corridor, the only «lifeline» connecting Artsakh with Armenia, causing a humanitarian crisis, and on September 19, 2023, it launched another military aggression against Artsakh, which was left alone, committing war crimes and ethnic cleansing against the Armenian population, which ultimately led to the complete de-Armenization of Artsakh.

Despite these disastrous consequences, negotiations on a «peace» agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan continued throughout 2024. From the statements of the leaders of the two countries, it was understood that the draft document being circulated consists of 17 articles, 15 of which were agreed upon. Initially, the Armenian side tried to resist the inclusion of two articles proposed by Azerbaijan in the text of the document that clearly contradicted its interests. These articles concerned the non-deployment of armed forces of third countries on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, as well as the refusal of interstate claims filed against each other in international judicial bodies and the non-filing of such claims in the future (Алиев сообщил, по каким вопросам Армения и Азербайджан не достигли соглашения в проекте мирного договора, <https://armenpress.am/ru/article/1207738>). The Armenian side proposed to Azerbaijan to sign the document with the agreed 15 articles and leave the discussion of the controversial provisions for the future, but Baku insisted that the agreement should either be signed with all 17 articles or not be signed at all. Driven by the desire to establish peace, the Armenian side gave in and agreed to meet Azerbaijan's demands (Marukyan, 2025, 19).

Taking advantage of the Armenian side's constant concessionary stance, the Baku regime was trying to gain maximum benefits and put forward new demands. The next Azerbaijani demands put forward outside the agreed text of the «peace» agreement concerned amendments to the Armenian Constitution, as it allegedly contains provisions threatening its territorial integrity, as well as the provision of extraterritorial land communication with Nakhichevan through the so-called «Zangezur Corridor» through the territory of Armenia.

Due to the passive role of the EU and Russia in the process of establishing «peace» between Azerbaijan and Armenia for various objective and subjective reasons, the US took the initiative at this stage of the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. As a result of the intervention of the US President, a meeting between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan was organized at the White House in Washington on August 8, 2025, as a result of which a number of documents were signed. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan signed bilateral cooperation agreements with the United States in various fields. It is noteworthy that the USA signed an agreement with

Azerbaijan that clearly contradicted Armenian interests, by which Washington finally removed from its domestic legislation the resolution 907 of the «Freedom Act» restriction prohibiting the provision of American military aid to Azerbaijan, the operation of which had been suspended every year since 2001 (**Balian**, <https://modernndiplomacy.eu/2025/08/18/more-diplomacy-not-minefields-needed-to-secure-peace-in-the-south-caucasus/>).

The following three documents were of the greatest importance in the context of establishing peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and ensuring stability in the South Caucasus region: the joint statement of the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as witnessed by the US President («Asbarez», 08.08.2025), the initialed peace agreement (Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, 11.08.2025) and the Memorandum of Understanding terminating the activities of the OSCE Minsk Group. In this regard, it is necessary to subject the mentioned documents to content analysis, trying to determine to what extent the provisions enshrined in them truly ensure the security, stability, and development of Armenia in particular.

## 2. Content analysis of the joint statement of the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as witnessed by the US President

In the first article of the joint statement of the two states, the parties undertake to make further efforts towards the signing and ratification of the initialed agreement on peace and the establishment of interstate relations («Asbarez», 08.08.2025). This formulation perhaps hints at Azerbaijan's direct demand to amend the Armenian Constitution, as it allegedly contains territorial claims against the latter, and therefore it is considered a mandatory condition for signing a peace agreement (**Байрамов**, <https://www.armiya.az/ru/news/230734>). Despite the fact that the Armenian side also stated that the Azerbaijani Constitution contains territorial claims against Armenia, it nevertheless refused to make a reciprocal claim (В Конституции Азербайджана содержатся территориальные претензии к Армении, и мы можем представить письменную аргументацию по этому поводу всем международным партнерам, <https://armenpress.am/ru/article/1200874>).

Under point 2 of the document, the parties announce a joint initiative to dissolve the OSCE Minsk Group, established to resolve the Karabakh conflict, by signing a corresponding memorandum of understanding on this matter. It should not be considered a coincidence that the initiative came from the Azerbaijan to dissolve the Minsk Group. Regardless of the de facto suspension of the activities of

that format, even its de jure existence was a certain lever in the hands of the Armenian side to restrain Azerbaijan's aggressive posture, which could be used in the process of restoring the violated rights of the Artsakh population. Baku believes that it has managed to «solve» the Karabakh conflict by force, so it already considers this international format unnecessary and needed to be eliminated. In this regard, it is pertinent to recall that in 2020, after the 44-day war, when the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs traveled to Baku and tried to return the issue to the framework of this format, the Azerbaijani President replied that he had not invited them (Алиев заявил сопредседателям Минской группы ОБСЕ, что в Баку их не приглашал, <https://armenpress.am/ru/article/1037651>). The Armenian side actually gave in to Azerbaijani pressure on this issue as well, and after presenting two joint demands, there was no longer any chance of preserving the Minsk Group format, at least de jure.

The next point of the statement concerns the unblocking of communication channels for domestic, bilateral, and international traffic between the two countries, which should take place on the basis of preserving the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and jurisdiction of states. These general formulations imply the opening of a communication route, which is considered a priority for Azerbaijan, which should ensure unhindered communication between its main part and Nakhichevan through the territory of Armenia, on mutually beneficial terms for the latter («Asbarez», 08.08.2025).

The appearance of this point in the document is not at all accidental, as it was previously included in Article 9 of the trilateral statement signed by the leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia on November 9/10, 2020, after the 44-day war, which obliged Armenia to ensure secure communication routes between the main part of Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, which were to be controlled by the Border Guard Service of the Russian Federal Security Service (Заявление президента Азербайджана, премьер-министра Армении и президента России 10.11.2020, <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384>). Let us recall that at the time of signing this document, Artsakh was already deprived of the second Sotk-Karvachar road connecting it with Armenia and the only connection was provided by the Berdzor (Lachin) corridor, following which Azerbaijan wanted to obtain more than one land communication route connecting it with Nakhichevan through the territory of Armenia.

In order to implement the provisions on unblocking communication routes, on January 11, 2021, the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia signed the second trilateral statement, accepting the proposal of the Russian President to create a joint working group of the three countries, which was to submit for approval a list and schedule of programs for the restoration or construction of

railway and road facilities through the territories of Azerbaijan and Armenia (Заявление президента Азербайджана, премьер-министра Армении и президента России 11.01.2021, <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5606>). After the signing of the second trilateral statement, the Azerbaijani president began to call the land communication route with Nakhichevan the «Zangezur Corridor», following the example of the Lachin Corridor (Без Зангезурского коридора Армения навсегда останется тупиком, <https://www.aa.com.tr/ru/3105506>). The Azerbaijani president ignored the fact that Nakhichevan has a land border not only with Iran, but also with Turkey, and after the territories of Artsakh came under Azerbaijani control, it had turned into an enclave, and the Lachin corridor was the only «lifeline» connecting it with Armenia (Марукян, 2021, 54).

From the text of the joint statement signed by the leaders of the two countries in Washington, Armenia's unilateral concessions become even more evident from the wording of the next paragraph of the document, which states that Armenia undertakes to cooperate with the United States and third parties jointly selected by it to implement the so-called «Trump Road to International Peace and Prosperity» (TRIPP) project on its territory. Although the document speaks of the reciprocity and mutual benefit of unblocking the routes, Azerbaijan has not assumed any such obligation in return, and the Armenian side will not be able to use the communication routes passing through Nakhichevan, and especially the main part of Azerbaijan, under the same conditions.

In the last article of the joint statement, the parties undertake to exclude the use of force in the future, once again referring to the UN Charter and the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration. Surprisingly, this clause contains the obligation of the parties to exclude any attempt at revenge, now and in the future. Considering the fact that after the 44-day war in 2020, high-ranking Azerbaijani officials, including the president, as well as official media outlets, have regularly accused the Armenian side of possible revenge and revanchism, it is obvious that such formulations were included in the document at the insistence of Baku itself. Moreover, possible steps by Armenia to promote and protect the right of safe and dignified return of the Armenian population of Artsakh can be viewed as a manifestation of «revenge» or «revanchism» by the Baku regime.

### 3. The significance of the TRIPP project in establishing peace and stability in the South Caucasus region

Since the joint statement signed between the leaders of the two countries in Washington on August 8 contains a special article dedicated to the TRIPP project,

which is perceived by both Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the USA, as an important factor in establishing peace and ensuring stability in the South Caucasus region, it is necessary to analyze this project separately.

Some experts believe that Aliyev initially opposed the TRIPP project, tried to hinder or delay diplomatic discussions and negotiations around it, and was only forced to agree to the American proposal under pressure from the US president (**Kopalyan**, <https://evnreport.com/evn-security-report/pax-americana-comes-to-the-south-caucasus/>), which aims to put an end to the maximalist aspirations of obtaining an extraterritorial connection with Nakhichevan through Armenia's Syunik region, as well as to Baku's threats to seize the so-called «Zangezur Corridor» by force (**Balian**, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/08/18/more-diplomacy-not-minefields-needed-to-secure-peace-in-the-south-caucasus/>). One can agree with such judgments only with certain reservations. If we are talking about the creation of an uncontrolled corridor through Armenian territory to Nakhichevan by force, then, of course, the US involvement in the TRIPP project can be a certain deterrent factor so that Azerbaijan and Turkey do not try to obtain concessions from Armenia on this issue through military force or the threat of it. On the other hand, however, the document talks about providing an «unimpeded route», which somewhat satisfies Azerbaijan's interest, since for Baku it is a secondary issue whether Russia or the United States will guarantee its uninterrupted land connection with Nakhichevan through the territory of Armenia.

As for the motives for the US involvement in TRIPP, through this project, Washington is primarily trying to create a new region of the South Caucasus with its more tangible influence, the relations between the states of which should be built on the basis of the exclusion of military force, the development of trade and communication routes, stability and interconnectedness (**Kopalyan**, <https://evnreport.com/evn-security-report/pax-americana-comes-to-the-south-caucasus/>). From the point of view of geopolitical interests, Washington is trying to turn TRIPP into an important infrastructural hub of the «Trans-Caspian International Transport Route» or the «Middle Corridor» leading from China to Europe through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and/or Armenia, Turkey, through which it will establish control over trade flows along this international route, bypassing Russia and Iran (**D'Anieri, Epstein**, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/how-trumps-tripp-triumph-can-advance-us-interests-in-the-south-caucasus/#bluf3>).

The geographical distance of the US from the South Caucasus forces it to outsource some functions in the region to its NATO ally Turkey, so the new South Caucasus concept also includes the prospect of opening the Armenian border with Turkey. The US tends to view the agreements reached within the framework of the Washington meeting as a three-year process, which is supposed to be completed by 2028 with the signing of a final peace document between Armenia and Azerbaijan

(**Kopalyan**, <https://evnreport.com/evn-security-report/pax-americana-comes-to-the-south-caucasus/>).

Naturally, both Russia and China, as well as Iran, are well aware of the goals the American side pursues through its involvement in the TRIPP project, as it clearly contradicts their interests. Russia and Iran have already expressed their concerns regarding this project and especially Armenia's involvement in it. Although the Armenian side has stated that its participation in the TRIPP project does not mean that Armenia is changing its foreign policy vector and that it continues to pursue a balanced and balancing policy, it is obvious that by signing the Washington document and inviting the US to the South Caucasus, it has actually changed the balance of power in the region, on the one hand, at least increasing the influence of Washington's «soft power» in the region at the expense of weakening Russia's positions. On the other hand, by establishing an American presence on the Armenian-Iranian border, Armenia has created artificial tension with friendly Iran. In this regard, it is important how the Armenian-Iranian state border will be controlled under the conditions of the creation and operation of the TRIPP, will Armenia maintain its border access with Iran, and what fate awaits the «North-South» route, which has been implemented for many years, which will intersect with the TRIPP.

The joint statement adopted as a result of negotiations between the US Secretary of State and the Armenian Foreign Minister on TRIPP provides certain clarifications regarding various issues related to the implementation of the project.

The joint statement circulated specifically states that TRIPP will be a multimodal transit route, which means that in addition to the construction of a highway and railway and the control of the transportation of goods and passengers, power cables, oil and gas pipelines will be laid, which will ensure the transit of energy resources. Within the framework of TRIPP, it is planned to create modern data and information transmission systems using fiber optic networks («ԹՐԻՓՓ նախագծի՝ Հայաստան-ԱՄՆ իրականացման շրջանակի հրապարակման վերաբերյալ համասուղե հայտարարություն, <https://www.mfa.am/hy/press-releases/2026/01/14/TRIPP/13721>).

According to the initial agreement, the territory of Armenia designated for TRIPP will be put into operation by the company for an initial period of 49 years, and if none of the parties has any objections after the expiration of this period, it can be extended for another 50 years. Armenia offers the United States a 74% stake in «TRIPP Development Company», keeping a 26% stake for itself. After the 49th year of the agreement, Armenia's share will be increased to 49% over the next 50 years (**D'Anieri, Epstein**, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/how-trumps-tripp-triumph-can-advance-us-interests-in-the-south-caucasus/#bluf3>). Thus, the American side will receive superprofits from the activities of the Armenian-

American joint company for 49 years, and only in the next period will Armenia's expected profits be approximately equal to the American ones, but the controlling stake in the company will continue to remain in the hands of the US.

Although the controlling stake in «TRIPP Development Company» will belong to the United States, according to the agreement, decisions on crucial issues, in particular, changes in the shareholders of the joint company (including the sale, donation, merger, separation, reorganization or any other legal or factual action) and changes in owners can be made only with the consent of the governments of Armenia and the US («ԹԻՓՓ նախագծի՝ Հայաստան-ԱՄՆ իրականացման շրջանակի հրապարակման վերաբերյալ համատեղ հայտարարություն, <https://www.mfa.am/hy/press-releases/2026/01/14/TRIPP/13721>). The same applies to cases when, when implementing highway and railway projects, «TRIPP Development Company» establishes subsidiaries - special purpose organizations - to design and carry out construction work on certain infrastructures, as well as to manage them in the future.

The enshrining of these provisions of theoretical equality between the US and Armenia in the TRIPP draft cannot, however, exclude the possibility that, having in practice a controlling stake in the joint company, the US, even without obtaining the consent of the Armenian side, will try to make arbitrary decisions or will try to obtain consent through certain pressures. It cannot be ruled out that the US may also use the same approach when assigning/subcontracting certain works to companies from other countries, for example, Turkey or Azerbaijan. It is difficult to imagine how Armenia will navigate such situations, especially since the available sources say nothing about the mechanisms regulating such cases. At this point, the only mechanism in place is for Armenia and the US to each appoint a senior official as TRIPP implementation coordinators, who will be responsible for inter-agency coordination and liaison with the «TRIPP Development Company» («ԹԻՓՓ նախագծի՝ Հայաստան-ԱՄՆ իրականացման շրջանակի հրապարակման վերաբերյալ համատեղ հայտարարություն, <https://www.mfa.am/hy/press-releases/2026/01/14/TRIPP/13721>).

It is planned to implement the «Front Office/Back Office» model as a border control mechanism. The functions of initial collection of customer documents, provision of information and guidance, collection of trade distribution fees, and payment processing at the «Front Office» will be performed by employees of a third-party, private operator company that has signed a contract with «TRIPP Development Company» (**D'Anieri, Epstein**, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/how-trumps-tripp-triumph-can-advance-us-interests-in-the-south-caucasus/#bluf3>). The RA state bodies located in the «Back Office» will carry out their assigned customs and border functions: making and formulating final customs decisions, implementing security, migration control, issuing permits and approvals, collecting taxes, customs duties, and other mandatory payments to the RA state budget («ԹԻՓՓ նախագծի՝ Հայաստան-ԱՄՆ

իրականացման շրջանակի հրապարակման վերաբերյալ համատեղ հայտարարություն, <https://www.mfa.am/hy/press-releases/2026/01/14/TRIPP/13721>).

In fact, a third-party private operator company hired by «TRIPP Development Company», to whose selection the Armenian side should theoretically consent, will work in the «Front Office», directly inspecting incoming Azerbaijani cargo, while Armenian officials and border control personnel will be in the «Back Office», exercising overall control over the process (**Kopalyan**, <https://evnreport.com/evn-security-report/pax-america-comes-to-the-south-caucasus/>). In the case of implementing this model, border and customs functions in the TRIPP zone will be carried out by the state bodies of the Republic of Armenia based on preliminary information provided by a private company working in an intermediary «Front Office» or information obtained from modern information systems («ԹԻՓՓ նախագծի՝ Հայաստան-ԱՄՆ իրականացման շրջանակի հրապարակման վերաբերյալ համատեղ հայտարարություն, <https://www.mfa.am/hy/press-releases/2026/01/14/TRIPP/13721>). It turns out that claims about Armenia's full sovereignty or jurisdiction in the TRIPP zone are at least questionable. Naturally, it will not be possible in all cases to effectively control possible abuses committed by a private company performing a given function or to timely neutralize the risks of entering in transaction with, for example, the Azerbaijani side.

When discussing reciprocity in the operation of communication routes, it is enough to mention the fact that, refuting this claim, a «Front Office/Back Office» model will not be implemented in Azerbaijan, and Armenian passengers wishing to travel through Nakhichevan or the main part of Azerbaijan will have to communicate directly with Azerbaijani customs and security officers, and their luggage will be checked by them.

The published statement of agreements reached between the parties on the TRIPP does not contain any provisions on ensuring the security of the zone. It can be assumed that as a result of negotiations on security issues, a separate agreement may be adopted in the future, according to which, in order to prevent possible provocations and artificial incidents by Azerbaijan in the route zone, this function will also be delegated to the US or some other private security company, in consultation with Armenia.

#### 4. Content analysis of the articles of the initialed Agreement «On the Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations»

The provisions of the first articles of the Agreement «On the Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations» initialed in Washington between Armenia and Azerbaijan on August 8 are based on the fundamental norms and principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, and the Alma-Ata Declaration of December 21, 1991.

According to Article 1, the contracting parties mutually recognize the administrative borders of the former USSR republics as interstate borders between them and undertake to respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders (Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, 11.08.2025). With these formulations, which at first glance seem formal, Armenia actually recognizes Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan. The Prime Minister of Armenia has made similar statements in the past, even noting that he recognizes the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan with an area of 86,600 km<sup>2</sup> (Prime Minister N. Pashinyan's interview with «The Wall Street Journal», <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2023/10/25/>), and although the Azerbaijani side has recognized the territorial integrity of Armenia, it has never indicated the area of the territory in return. This is explained by the fact that more than 200 km<sup>2</sup> of Armenia's sovereign territory is occupied by Azerbaijani forces, and the Armenian side has not yet presented a clear demand for the withdrawal of Azerbaijani forces from these territories.

Under Article 2 of the document, the parties acknowledge that they have no territorial claims against each other and shall not plan, prepare, encourage, or support actions aimed at dismembering or violating, in whole or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of the other party, and under Article 4, they have undertaken not to interfere in each other's internal affairs (Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, 11.08.2025).

The content of this article included by Azerbaijan in the document is an attempt to exclude the possibility of Armenia's future return of Artsakh Armenians to their homeland in dignity and safety, and especially the possibility of Armenia's demand for the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh, as this would violate Azerbaijan's «political unity» or would be interference in its «internal affairs». On the other hand, however, the Armenian side does not officially raise the issue that Azerbaijan is clearly violating its obligations under Articles 2 and 4 when it

consistently promotes the idea of the so-called «Western Azerbaijan» and periodically speaks about the «return» of Azerbaijanis to those territories.

Article 3 states that the parties undertake to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other and shall not allow any third party to use their territory for the use of force against the other party (Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, 11.08.2025). Taking into account the deepening allied relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey, primarily in the military and military-technical spheres, and the regular joint military exercises, including in the territory of Nakhichevan, this article is important from the point of view of excluding the use of force against Armenia and restraining Azerbaijan's ambitions to seize part of its territory by force.

The provision on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two states contained in Article 5 of the document is rather vague, as the timing for starting that process and the level of relations are not specified. And in Article 6, the parties reaffirm their commitment to continue the work of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border commissions in good faith in accordance with the agreed rules, with the aim of achieving the conclusion of an agreement on the demarcation and demarcation of the state border of the two countries (Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, 11.08.2025). This article again does not specify the deadline for this process, and there are no dispute resolution mechanisms, which gives grounds to conclude that this process will be constantly delayed for an indefinite period of time.

Article 7 of the document states that the parties will not deploy armed forces of third countries along their common border. Considering the shift in the balance of power in the region in favor of Azerbaijan as a result of the 44-day war in 2020 and the difficulties of resisting the Baku regime's next aggression with its own forces, it is natural that the Armenian side can imagine ensuring its security with the help of a third party. In some ways, this can also be considered a manifestation of the invitation of the EU monitoring mission, which, by conducting constant monitoring on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, contributes to the prevention of border incidents. In this regard, it is quite expected that, regardless of the fact that the EU monitoring mission is not armed, Azerbaijan will try to view it as a «third party» and demand that Armenia terminate the mission. Based on the above circumstances, the Armenian side initially refused to accept this demand of Azerbaijan (Алиев сообщил, по каким вопросам Армения и Азербайджан не достигли соглашения в проекте мирного договора, 18.12.2024, <https://armenpress.am/ru/article/1207738>).

Under Article 8, the parties agree to jointly combat intolerance, racial hatred and discrimination, separatism, radicalism and terrorism. This point is important for the Armenian side, as in 2020, during the 44-day Artsakh war, Turkey transported terrorists to the area of combat operations by military aircraft from the northern territories of Syria that had come under its control. After the de-Armenization of Artsakh, the terrorists who moved from Idlib did not leave the occupied territories of Artsakh and currently pose a threat to the border areas of both Iran and Armenia. The content of this article is consistent with the provision of the joint statement, which speaks of the obligation of the parties to exclude any attempt at retaliation in the future. In this regard, the Azerbaijani side may consider those fighting for the right of Artsakh Armenians to return with dignity and safety as those who spread racial hatred and discrimination, separatists, and extremists, demanding that Armenia take punitive measures against them. In this context, however, it is difficult to expect that the Armenian side will demand from Azerbaijan the suspension of the activities of the «Western Azerbaijan» community or its members.

As a means of reconciliation and confidence-building, the parties also undertake to investigate cases of missing persons and enforced disappearances that occurred during the armed conflict, specifying the mechanisms for implementing this process in a separate agreement (Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, 11.08.2025). In this regard, it is worth noting that, as early as Article 8 of the trilateral statement of November 9/10, 2020, Armenia and Azerbaijan had assumed a mutual obligation to exchange the bodies of those killed in the 44-day war in 2020, as well as prisoners of war and hostages (Заявление президента Азербайджана, премьер-министра Армении и президента России 10.11. 2020, <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384>). Taking advantage of the uncertainties in the implementation of the aforementioned obligations, in particular the lack of deadlines and mechanisms, the Azerbaijani side subjected Armenian prisoners of war, hostages, and forcibly detained persons to humiliation and torture, as well as delayed their return. Moreover, the Azerbaijani side was exploiting this issue, trying to extract additional concessions from the Armenian side that were not provided for in the document (Марукян, 2021, 52). In particular, in exchange for the return of Armenian prisoners and hostages, Baku demanded that the Armenian side provide maps of minefields (Ереван передал Баку карту минных полей в Карабахе в обмен на 15 заключенных, <https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-57709190>). The kidnapping and transfer of the military-political leadership of Artsakh to Baku, their illegal sentencing to long-term imprisonment through

trumped-up trials in violation of universal human rights norms, already provide sufficient grounds to assert that Azerbaijan will not fulfill these obligations.

Article 10 provides for the signing of cooperation agreements between the parties in the economic, transit and transport, environmental, humanitarian and cultural spheres (Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, 11.08.2025). This article primarily conceals Baku's ambitions regarding the so-called «Zangezur Corridor», aiming to obtain unhindered transit communication with Nakhichevan through the territory of Armenia, which found its expression in the joint statement in the form of agreements reached on the creation of TRIPP.

According to Article 11 of the initialed document, international obligations with third parties shall not impair the obligations of the parties under this agreement (Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, 11.08.2025). Based on the wording of this article, Armenia and Azerbaijan must subordinate their contractual obligations with their allies and strategic partners if they conflict with the obligations assumed under this agreement. In Armenia's case, these are primarily its allied obligations with Russia within the framework of the CSTO, as well as through bilateral agreements. In the case of Azerbaijan, we are talking about the deep and comprehensive military-political alliance with Turkey, which is also enshrined in the recently signed «Shushi Declaration» (Опубликован полный текст Шушинской декларации, подписанной между Азербайджаном и Турцией, <https://ru.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3440708.html>), in addition, Baku also has close military-technical cooperation with Israel. In this regard, it should be noted that the agreements within the framework of the CSTO and with Russia, in fact, did not ensure Armenia's security either during the 44-day Artsakh war in 2020 or during the successive Azerbaijani aggressions that occurred thereafter. In contrast, Azerbaijan's allied relations with Turkey and strategic partnership with Israel were clearly put to use not only during the large-scale aggressive war unleashed against Artsakh, but also during the attacks on the sovereign territory of Armenia and the occupation of certain territories. Despite all this, Baku will definitely demand from Armenia to subordinate the mentioned international legal bases that are part of its security system to the provisions of this article, while it is difficult to expect that the Armenian side will make such a demand towards Azerbaijan.

Article 12 of the preliminary agreement requires that neither party should attempt to justify the application of its domestic legislation in order to justify its failure to comply with the provisions of the agreement (Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan,

11.08.2025). It is noteworthy that the Armenian side tried to counter the precondition for amending the Constitution put forward by Azerbaijan with this article of the pre-signed document, stating that even if the wording in the Preamble of the Constitution is not changed, they will not be used by Armenia to fail to fulfill the obligations assumed by the given document. This provision is what the Armenian side is trying to explain by not making a reciprocal demand to change the Azerbaijani Constitution, believing that this issue is resolved by this article (Աշխարհում չկա որևէ խաղաղության պայմանագիր, որ պատասխանում է բոլոր հնարավոր հարցերին, <https://www.primeminister.am/hy/press-release/item/2024/09/18/>). However, these arguments do not satisfy the Azerbaijani side, and the Baku regime continues to insist on the precondition of amending the Constitution of Armenia.

In the second paragraph of the same article, the parties refer to the norm of Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, according to which, until the document enters into force, the parties must refrain from actions that may affect its subject matter and purpose (Блатова, 1982, 75). Regardless of the fact that the dates for the final signing and entry into force of the agreement are still uncertain, Azerbaijan has already allowed itself certain actions that contradict the subject and goals of the initialed document. In particular, contrary to their declared goals of establishing peace and relations with Armenia, high-ranking Azerbaijani officials, including the country's president, continue their anti-Armenian rhetoric, make openly threatening statements against Armenia and the Armenian people, talk about opening the so-called «Zangezur Corridor» by force, «returning Azerbaijanis to Western Azerbaijan» and «keeping Armenians in constant fear» as enemies (Враг всегда должен бояться нас, <https://caliber.az/post/>). Such actions by Azerbaijan clearly affect the subject and goals of the peace agreement between the two countries. Such gross violations of Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of International Treaties give the Armenian side sufficient legal grounds to demand explanations from Baku, as well as to appeal to the American side, in particular the US President, so that the latter, as a mediator/witness to the signing of the given document, exerts pressure on the Azerbaijani side to completely exclude such actions. Otherwise, the Armenian side has the right to suspend the signing of the document and the fulfillment of obligations until the violations are eliminated and guarantees are provided to prevent their recurrence.

Article 13 of the document refers to certain mechanisms for the implementation of the agreement, in particular, it mentions the establishment of a bilateral commission based on the agreed terms, which will monitor the implementation of the provisions of the agreement. It is natural that an equal number of representatives from the contracting parties will be included in this

committee, which will not allow the parties to overcome disputes related to the interpretation, implementation and supervision of the provisions of the agreement, which, according to the next Article 14, the parties will strive to resolve through direct consultations, and if these do not lead to a result acceptable to both parties within six months, other means of peaceful settlement of disputes should be sought (Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, 11.08.2025). It should be noted that international treaty law provides for the right and possibility of resorting to the UN International Court of Justice or to international arbitration by a disinterested third party as a means of dispute resolution, which is enshrined in Article 66 of the 1969 Vienna Convention (Блатова, 1982, 91). In fact, in this important article of the initialed agreement, the parties did not enshrine these accepted regulations of international contract law.

The obvious concessions of the Armenian side are also noticeable in the content of Article 15, according to which, within one month after the agreement enters into force, the parties must withdraw interstate claims, complaints and suspend existing disputes, undertake not to file new claims against each other and not to be involved in international legal proceedings filed by any third country against a party to the agreement. Moreover, in the second paragraph of the same article, the parties undertake not to carry out, encourage or engage in any hostile actions against each other in the diplomatic, informational or other spheres that contradict this agreement and to hold regular consultations for this purpose (Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, 11.08.2025). It is obvious that this article was included in the text of the agreement at the request of Azerbaijan and exclusively stems from its interests, since based on the claims submitted by Armenia to interstate judicial bodies, the UN International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, decisions on interim measures have already been adopted by those bodies against the Baku regime, and the claims submitted by the latter have not had serious consequences for Armenia due to insufficient substantiation (Marukyan, 2025, 18).

Regardless of the fact that Armenia has already ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and has become a member state of that international judicial body, based on its obligation under Article 15, it should not exercise its right to submit applications to that body regarding crimes committed by Azerbaijan in Artsakh and the border territories of Armenia. The same applies to arbitration courts, and in this context it becomes clear why the parties did not mention arbitration as a means of resolving disputes in Article 14 of the document.

It is noteworthy that these obligations do not apply to domestic proceedings, which allows Azerbaijan to continue to hold the military-political leadership of Artsakh and other Armenian hostages convicted in trumped-up and illegal trials in Baku prisons. The most serious omission of the Armenian side, which made significant concessions to Azerbaijan on this issue, is that it did not demand the extension of these obligations to domestic proceedings as well. In addition, among the important omissions of the document, it should also be noted that the rights of Armenians forcibly displaced from Artsakh as a result of Azerbaijan's latest aggression in September 2023, including their right to return and issues of protecting historical heritage, were completely ignored (**Balian**, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/08/18/more-diplomacy-not-minefields-needed-to-secure-peace-in-the-south-caucasus/>).

### Conclusion

Based on the above, we can conclude that the unique articles and provisions of the initialed «peace» agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, on which the Armenian side can rely to protect its interests and rights, are formulated rather vaguely, and there are no deadlines or mechanisms for their implementation. On the contrary, the articles that benefit the interests of the Azerbaijani side are formulated quite specifically, in some cases even clear deadlines for their implementation are set. In fact, during the negotiations over the text of the agreement, the Armenian side did not make sufficient efforts to clarify the articles that benefit its interests as much as possible, and it is natural that the Azerbaijani side will interpret all the vague provisions of the preliminary agreement in its favor.

In summary, let us note that with the document signed in Washington on August 8, the US effectively linked the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan to the TRIPP project and the normalization of Armenia's relations with Turkey. Considering the fact that Azerbaijan has repeatedly raised the issue of the so-called «Zangezur Corridor» as a precondition for establishing peace with Armenia, it is quite expected that Baku will refuse to sign a peace treaty before the full implementation of TRIPP. Turkey, in turn, also conditions the establishment of relations with Armenia and the opening of the border with Azerbaijan on the signing of a peace treaty and the opening of the so-called «Zangezur Corridor», in this case, on the launch of the same TRIPP.

As for the United States, the mediator in the peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Washington views the TRIPP project exclusively in the context of its geopolitical interests and goals, trying to turn it into a kind of barrier

on the Armenia-Iran border and push not only Iran, but also Russia out of the South Caucasus region, so it is difficult to expect that this project will bring real peace to Armenia and stability and prosperity to the region. The latest attack against Iran by the US and Israel tandem leads to the conclusion that the unpredictable consequences of the dangerous developments taking place in the Middle East could also turn the South Caucasus region into a hotbed of instability.

**Արմեն Յ. Մարության** – գիտական հոդվածների, հայերեն, ռուսերեն և անգլերեն մենագրությունների հեղինակ է և փաստաթղթերի ժողովածուների կազմող: Գիտական հետաքրքրությունների շրջանակում են Հայկական հարցի և Հայոց ցեղասպանության պատմության հարցերը և Հայոց ցեղասպանության հետևանքների հաղթահարման հիմնախնդիրները:

### Bibliography

1. Աշխարհում չկա որևէ խաղաղության պայմանագիր, որ պատասխանում է բոլոր հնարավոր հարցերին, <https://www.primeminister.am/hy/press-release/item/2024/09/18/> (30.01.2026)
2. **Չոլյան Ս.**, Ալմա-Աթայի հռչակագրով Հայաստանը 1991 թ. Ադրբեջանի հետ հարաբերություններ չի հաստատել, տարածքային ամբողջականությունը չի նանաչել, ԱՊՀ-ի համաձայնագիրը Հայաստանը վավերացրել է 10 վերապահումով, <https://www.pastinfo.am/hy/news/2022/10/19/6v5dy8lae/1478229> (20.02.2026)
3. «Թրամփի ուղի՝ հանուն միջազգային խաղաղության և բարգավաճման» (ԹԲԻՓՓ) նախագծի՝ Հայաստան-ԱՄՆ իրականացման շրջանակի հրապարակման վերաբերյալ համատեղ հայտարարություն, <https://www.mfa.am/hy/press-releases/2026/01/14/ TRIPP/13721> (18.02.2026)
4. Հայաստանի համար հիմնարար է ԼՂ վերջնական կարգավիճակի հարցը. հրապարակվել են հայկական կողմի ներկայացրած 6 կետերը, <https://armenpress.am/arm/news/1083187.html> (20.02.2026)
5. **Մարությանյան Վ.**, 2021-ին թշնամին ՀՀ տարածքից օկուպացրել է նվազագույնը 50 քվմ տարածք, <https://hetq.am/hy/article/148314> (20.01.2026)
6. Алиев заявил сопредседателям Минской группы ОБСЕ, что в Баку их не приглашал, <https://armenpress.am/ru/article/1037651> (14.02.2026)
7. Алиев сообщил, по каким вопросам Армения и Азербайджан не достигли соглашения в проекте мирного договора, 18 декабря 2024, <https://armenpress.am/ru/article/1207738> (20.02.2026)
8. Алма-Атинская Декларация 21 декабря 1991 года, <https://e-cis.info/page/3373/79406/> (10.01.2026)
9. **Байрамов Дж.** «Территориальные претензии в Конституции Армении мешают подписанию мирного договора», <https://www.armiya.az/ru/news/230734> (20.12.2025)
10. Без Зангезурского коридора Армения навсегда останется тупиком, <https://www.aa.com.tr/ru/3105506> (20.12.2025)

11. В Конституции Азербайджана содержатся территориальные претензии к Армении, и мы можем представить письменную аргументацию по этому поводу всем международным партнерам, <https://armenpress.am/ru/article/1200874> (18.01.2026)
12. **Враг всегда должен бояться нас**, <https://caliber.az/post/ilham-aliev-vrag-vsegda-dolzhen-boyatsya-nas> (14.03.2026)
13. Ереван передал Баку карту минных полей в Карабахе в обмен на 15 заключенных, <https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-57709190> (20.12.2025)
14. Заявление президента Азербайджана, премьер-министра Армении и президента России 10 ноября 2020 года, <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384> (20.12.2025)
15. Заявление президента Азербайджана, премьер-министра Армении и президента России 11 января 2021 года, <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5606> (20.12.2025)
16. Заявление Президента Азербайджанской Республики, Премьер-министра Республики Армения и Президента Российской Федерации, <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5860> (20.12.2025)
17. **Марукян А.**, Политико-правовой анализ «Трехстороннего заявления» 10 ноября 2020 года «О прекращении огня в Нагорном Карабахе», «Բաժնեկր իրավաբանություն», Եր., 2021, N 1, с. 33-58.
18. Международное право в документах, сост. сборника **Н. Т. Блатова**, М., изд. Юрид. лит., 1982.
19. МИД Азербайджана огласил 5 принципов нормализации связей с Арменией, <https://www.aa.com.tr/ru/2534649> (14.12.2025)
20. **Опубликован полный текст Шушинской декларации, подписанной между Азербайджаном и Турцией**, <https://ru.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3440708.html> (20.12.2025)
21. **Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, 11 August 2025**, <https://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/2025/08/11/Initialed%20Arm-Az%20Peace%20Agreement%20text/13394> (09.01.2026)
22. **Balian H.**, More Diplomacy, Not Minefields, Needed to Secure Peace in the South Caucasus, Modern Diplomacy, August 18, 2025, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/08/18/more-diplomacy-not-minefields-needed-to-secure-peace-in-the-south-caucasus/> (14.03.2026)
23. **D'Anieri A., Epstein J.**, How Trump's 'TRIPP' triumph can advance US interests in the South Caucasus, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/how-trumps-tripp-triumph-can-advance-us-interests-in-the-south-caucasus/#bluf3> (14.03.2026)
24. **Kopalyan N.**, Pax Americana Comes to the South Caucasus, 9 August 2025, EVN Report, <https://evnreport.com/evn-security-report/pax-americana-comes-to-the-south-caucasus/> (14.03.2026)
25. **Marukyan A.**, Nakhichevan at the “Crossroads” of Pan-Turanian and Global Projects, «Բաժնեկր իրավաբանություն», Եր., 2025, N 3 (39), p. 5-25.
26. Press statement by President Charles Michel following the trilateral meeting with President of Azerbaijan and Prime Minister of Armenia, 31 August 2022, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/08/31/> (20.12.2025)
27. Prime Minister Pashinyan's interview with “The Wall Street Journal”, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2023/10/25/> (20.12.2025)
28. Statement following quadrilateral meeting between President Aliyev, Prime Minister Pashinyan, President Macron and President Michel, 6 October 2022, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/10/07/> (20.12.2025)
29. Text of Declaration Signed By Pashinyan and Aliyev, “Asbarez”, 8 August 2025,

## Bibliography (Latin Script)

1. **Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, 11 August 2025**, <https://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/2025/08/11/Initialled%20Arm-Az%20Peace%20Agreement%20text/13394>
2. Aliev soobshhil, po kakim voprosam Armeniya i Azerbaydzhan ne dostigli soglasheniya v proekte mirnogo dogovora, 18 dekabrya 2024, <https://armenpress.am/ru/article/1207738> (in Russian)
3. Aliev zavjavit sopredsedatelyam Minskoy gruppy OBSE, chto v Baku ih ne priglasjal, <https://armenpress.am/ru/article/1037651> (in Russian)
4. Alma-Atinskaya Deklaraciya 21 dekabrya 1991 goda, <https://e-cis.info/page/3373/79406/> (in Russian)
5. **Ashxarhum chka oreve' xaghaghut'yan paymanagir, or patasxanowm e' bolor hnaravor harcerin**, <https://www.primeminister.am/hy/press-release/item/2024/09/18/> (in Armenian)
6. **Balian H.**, More Diplomacy, Not Minefields, Needed to Secure Peace in the South Caucasus, Modern Diplomacy, August 18, 2025, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/08/18/more-diplomacy-not-minefields-needed-to-secure-peace-in-the-south-caucasus/>
7. **Bayramov Dzh.** «Territorial'nye pretenzii v Konstitucii Armenii meshayut podpisaniyu mirnogo dogovora», <https://www.armiya.az/ru/news/230734> (in Russian)
8. Bez Zangezurskogo koridora Armeniya navsegda ostanetsya tupikom, <https://www.aa.com.tr/ru/3105506> (in Russian)
9. **D'Anieri A., Epstein J.**, How Trump's 'TRIPP' triumph can advance US interests in the South Caucasus, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/how-trumps-tripp-triumph-can-advance-us-interests-in-the-south-caucasus/#bluf3>
10. Hayastani hamar himnara e' LGH verjnakan kargavichaki harcy'. hraparakvel en haykakan koghmi nerkayacrac' 6 ketery', <https://armenpress.am/arm/news/1083187.html> (in Armenian)
11. **Kopalyan N.**, Pax Americana Comes to the South Caucasus, 9 August 2025, EVN Report, <https://evnreport.com/evn-security-report/pax-americana-comes-to-the-south-caucasus/>
12. **Marukyan A.**, Nakhichevan at the “Crossroads” of Pan-Turanian and Global Projects, «Banber hayagituf'yan», Yer., 2025, N 3 (39), p. 5-25.
13. **Marukyan A.**, Politiko-pravovoy analiz «Trehstoronnego zayavleniya» 10 noyabrya 2020 goda «O prekrashhenii ognya v Nagornom Karabakhe», «Banber hayagituf'yan», Yer., 2021, N 1, s. 33-58. (in Russian)
14. Mezhdunarodnoe pravo v dokumentakh, sost. sbornika **N. T. Blatova**, M., izd. Yurid. lit., 1982 (in Russian)
15. MID Azerbaydzhana oglasil 5 principov normalizacii svyazey s Armeniyey, <https://www.aa.com.tr/ru/2534649> (in Russian)
16. Opublikovan polniy tekst Shushinskoy deklaracii, podpisannoy mezhdru Azerbaydzhanom i Turciyey, <https://ru.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3440708.html> (in Russian)
17. Press statement by President Charles Michel following the trilateral meeting with President of Azerbaijan and Prime Minister of Armenia, 31 August 2022, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/08/31/>
18. Prime Minister Pashinyan's interview with “The Wall Street Journal”, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2023/10/25/>

19. **Sarukhanyan V.**, 2021-in t'shnamin HH tarac'qic o'kupacrel e' nvazaguyny' 50 qkm tarac'q, <https://hetq.am/hy/article/148314> (in Armenian)
20. Statement following quadrilateral meeting between President Aliyev, Prime Minister Pashinyan, President Macron and President Michel, 6 October 2022, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/10/07/>
21. Text of Declaration Signed By Pashinyan and Aliyev, "Asbarez", 8 August 2025, <https://asbarez.com/text-of-declaration-signed-by-pashinyan-and-aliyev/>
22. «Tramp'i ughi` hanun mijazgayin xaghaghut'yan ev bargavachman» (TRIPP) naxage'i` Hayastan-AMN irakanacman shrjanaki hraparakman veraberyal hamategh haytararut'yun, <https://www.mfa.am/hy/press-releases/2026/01/14/TRIPP/13721> (in Armenian)
23. V Konstitucii Azerbaydzhana soderzhatsya territorial'nye pretenzii k Armenii, i my mozhem predstavit' pis'mennuyu argumentaciyu po jetomu povodu vsem mezhdunarodnym partneram, <https://armenpress.am/ru/article/1200874> (in Russian)
24. **Vrag-vsegda-dolzhen-boyatsya-nas**, <https://caliber.az/post/ilham-aliev-vrag-vsegda-dolzhen-boyatsya-nas> (in Russian)
25. Yerevan peredal Baku kartu minnykh poley v Karabakhe v obmen na 15 zakljuchennykh, <https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-57709190> (in Russian)
26. Zayavlenie prezidenta Azerbaydzhana, prem'er-ministra Armenii i prezidenta Rossii 10 noyabrya 2020 goda, <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384> (in Russian)
27. Zayavlenie prezidenta Azerbaydzhana, prem'er-ministra Armenii i prezidenta Rossii 11 yanvary 2021 goda, <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5606> (in Russian)
28. Zayavlenie Prezidenta Azerbaydzhanskoy Respubliki, Prem'er-ministra Respubliki Armeniya i Prezidenta Rossiyskoj Federacii, <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5860> (in Russian)
29. **Zolyan S.**, Alma-At'ayi hr'chakagrov Hayastany' 1991 t'. Adrbejani het haraberut'yunner chi hastatel, tarac'qayin amboghjakanut'yuny' chi chanachel, APH-i hamadzaynagiry' Hayastany' vaveracrel e' 10 verapahumov, <https://www.pastinfo.am/hy/news/2022/10/19/6v5dy8lae/1478229> (in Armenian)