Category Archives: SCIENTIFIC

And the prospects of forming an anti-Turkish alliance

Summary

Lilit V. Dallakyan

In recent years, trying to rediscover its role in the international arena,
Turkey expanded its influence in the Mediterranean basin, the Middle East and the
South Caucasus, using military, political and economic instruments. However, such
persistent and retrospective efforts led to the emergence of new obstacles and
barriers to Turkish progress, the accumulation of which over time can lead to the
formation of an anti-Turkish alliance.

Turkey is trying to use the so-called “bubble effect” in the international
arena. That is, that state, not having enough power politically and economically,
especially without being a superpower, artificially increases its role in the
international arena, trying to extort dividends from its strategic position and
simultaneous military presence in different regions. Obsessed with the ideas of
Pan-Turkism and neo-Ottomanism, Erdogan is ready to send troops to any part of
the world, because by creating zones of instability, he tries to force the great
powers to take him into account and to make concessions on important issues for
him.Taking into account the serious economic problems as the consequences of the
epidemic, the desire of the superpowers not to get involved in an active military
conflicts, the fear of terrorism and refugees issues, Turkey uses the policy of
blackmail to achieve its goals.Turkey has already created zones of instability in a
number of regions; he is waging a geopolitical struggle against the countries in the
same military alliance with him. They can be divided into three main directions:
the Mediterranean Sea, the Middle East and the South Caucasus. At the same time,
it should be noted that these issues are interrelated.

The increase of the element of nationalism in the content of Turkey’s foreign
policy is closely connected with the circumstances of the coalition with the nationalists
in the domestic political life. As a result, the country’s economic situation is
deteriorating day by day, so the time to extort dividends by speaking in the language of
blackmail with the international community is running out. Meanwhile, Erdogan has
plunged Turkey into such complicated deadlocks in domestic politics, foreign policy,
economy and even in civilazional issues, that his resignation will not be a sufficient
condition for coming out of them soon. But the whole problem is that the Turkish
president has intention to do everything to stay in power by the time of the celebration
of the 100th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey in 2023.

In all likelihood, a stubborn adventure of Erdogan is somewhat fueled by
certain Western powers, which, losing their former geopolitical function, see
Turkey as a tool to deepen confrontations on several playing fields and even a
playing card sacrificed for that purpose.

Therefore, on the one hand, they are now strengthening their defense alliance
with Greece, encouraging the formation of an anti-Turkish alliance already underway
in the Eastern Mediterranean, on the other hand, provoke Erdogan’s majestic winds
and directing him to Crimea, Ukraine and especially Central Asia. This wedge removal
policy is the old and also new methodology of Hitler’s pacification, in the role of which
Erdogan is forgiven for threatening to expel the ambassadors of the leading Western
countries. As the role of the Eastern Hitler assumed by Erdogan is not a direct threat to
the West, but to Armenia, Iran, Russia, and in the prospect for China, at some point, the
formation of an anti-Turkish alliance may unite the parties of the global confrontation,
especially the interests of Russia and the USA, as the Russian-Turkish Munich, which
made Armenia and Artsakh a new Czechoslovakia, has already failed on a global level.
Russia and Turkey have no longer territories to concede to each other, so the field of
their possible anti-western deal has been severely narrowed. Instead, the likelihood of a
deal with the West based on the third is superfluous principle against each other
increased, which could lead to the formation of a broad anti-Turkish collaboration
based on a combination of US and Russian interests.

As a player in the political development and modernization of the Republic of Armenia

Summary

Mariam M. Margaryan, Gevorg M. Ghukasyan
The results of the democratic transition in the post-Soviet space clearly show that vectorism (linear liberalization) led to crises of political development.

Due to the neglect of ethno-cultural peculiarities in the political process, almost all countries have faced crises of political development. The existence of such crises is explained by the fact that in the process of political modernization the measure of civilization has not been used as a basis for strategic management.

The civilizational dimension of political modernization makes it possible to consider the strategic management as a key mechanism for renouncing mechanical Westernization and implementing modernization based on its own civilizational identity.

As a result, there was a disappointment of expectations in the post-Soviet countries, which pushed citizens to alienate themselves from their own state, to replenish or to create their own ethnic communities in different countries. In case of continuous increase of the political role of the Diasporas, the citizens alienated from their own state have the opportunity to rediscover their own identity and to defend it in the current era of multiculturalism.

Summarizing the revolutionary changes taking place in the post-Soviet countries, it can be stated that overcoming the crises of political development presupposes a system of theoretical approaches and practical experience, which will allow completing the cultural, social-psychological institutional peculiarities when analyzing the political development and modernization in the Republic of Armenia. In this context, this article proposes to assess the impact of other actors in the political process on political modernization, in particular the institution of ethnic lobbying.

Mariam M. Karapetyan

The paper discusses the possibilities of using language teaching as a tool for the development of media literacy. In particular, methods of developing distance-setting skills in relation to media-texts through language analysis are given.

The metalinguistic, metacognitive meaning of this approach is interpreted. The school teaching of the language (in this case, Armenian) is considered as a way of institutional introduction of media literacy, and Armenian language teaching is considered as a tool for achieving mass media literacy. The paper also examines the conceptual fundamentals for the introduction of media literacy in “Armenian language”, namely, the compliance with the new subject criteria of education.

Theoretical observations are accompanied by practical tasks and by the analysis of theoretical and practical material from Armenian language textbooks. So, how specific linguistic topics can help in the development of media literacy?

Due to this circumstance, the paper has scientific and practical significance and can be used as a practical guide for introducing media literacy into language learning.

And the issue of Azeri-speaking regions of Iran

Summary

Sargis M. Mkrtchyan
Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan, which became independent after the collapse of the Soviet Union, have had difficult ups and downs over the past three decades. They were conditioned by the attractive and repulsive factors existing between the two countries.

Attracting factors are history, religion, language, being contiguous, opportunities for economic cooperation, etc. Among the repulsive factors are the issue of clarifying the legal regime of the Caspian Sea, the issue of Artsakh, different perceptions of the state-religion relations, the direction of foreign policy, especially the aspirations of the Republic of Azerbaijan towards the Azeri-speaking regions of Iran.

The problems of the Iranian Azeris and the ethnic groups of Iran in general, raised by the Pan-Turkic and the Pan-Azeri circles without any real basis, are mainly carried out for political and mercenary purposes. Modern communication resources and various means of propaganda are used. History, symbols, reality are distorted, cultural heritage is appropriated.

Since independence, the Republic of Azerbaijan has anchored the identity of its people on linguistic and ethnic factors, while after the Islamic Revolution, the Iranian authority has given priority to Islamic ideology and values. Azerbaijan has joined the Turkey-Israel-US axis, while Iran is trying to get closer to Russia. At present, Iran’s enemy (Israel) or rival states (Turkey) make good use of the issue of Iranian Azeris to weaken Iran and divide the country if possible.

During the past 30 years, in fact, repulsive factors have prevailed over gravitational factors. Today, there are more problems and distrust between the two countries than close relations.

The overt or covert aspirations of the Republic of Azerbaijan towards the Azeri-speaking regions of Iran are directly related to Iran’s national security. It is fraught with the danger of the division of Iran, which is not only a blow to Iran, but is the greatest threat to Armenia’s national security.

Summary

Regina A. Galustyan
A few Armenian and foreign researchers have mentioned the existence of social-Darwinism in the mainstream of the ideology of the Committee of Union and Progress (Young Turks). The aim of this article is to develop further this idea, mainly to show the possible ways social-Darwinism was implanted in the Young Turk nationalist ideology and its further manifestations. The article demonstrates that although not all high-ranking party members followed the philosophical school of Herbert Spencer, the main concept of the “survival of the fittest” was accepted by many Young Turk politicians at different levels of the party hierarchy.

In compliance with their social-Darwinist mindset, they saw war as a significant and inevitable stage in the development of the nation. Many politicians, including Mehmed Taalat, the Minister of Interior, saw the war as an opportunity to change the demographic, economic, foreign, and inner political situation of the empire. The government internalized Italo-Turkish (1911-1912), the Balkan wars (1912-1913), and World War I (1914-1918) to start a war against the Christian citizens of the empire, who were declared as “inner enemies” and “ulcers on the body of the state” endangering its existence. As a long-term goal this policy aimed at clearing the land from the non-assimilated national minorities, homogenizing the population, and establishing a national economy and a Turkish nation-state.

In the second part of the article, the intersection of the two ideas of socialDarwinism and Organicism is discussed. The basis of this philosophy is the belief that the laws of natural sciences identically operate in human society. From here derives the analogy of society and a living organism, and the conclusion that the healthier organism will win the struggle for existence. Starting from the Balkan Wars we encounter organicist terminology in Young Turk periodicals and in the lexicon of the party ideologues. With the outbreak of WWI and during the Armenian Genocide the medical justification of the killing took place, as according to the social-Darwinist mindset, the destruction of maladapted species is considered natural. In this ideological context the direct involvement in the killings of the Turkish doctors, and medical experiments on the Armenian victims are brought as an example.

In the end, the article attempts to analyze the relations of religion and socialDarwinism in Young Turks’ mindset, as well as their perception of morality.

Comparative Examination

Summary

Sarkis M. Mkrtchian
What is Pan-Azerism? What is the difference and what does it have in common with Pan-Turkism? The study proves that these two concepts are closely related.

At present, given that the conditions for raising and implementing pan-Turkic ideas are not favorable, the panturkists have promoted pan-Nazism, for which there is favorable land and with which anti-Iranian forces and countries are interested.

As those Pan-Turkic organizations and figures who pursue the idea of the creation of Whole Azerbaijan outwardly do not use the words Pan-Turkism and Great Turan, even though all of their programs and words refer to the principles of Pan-Turk theorists.

Pan-Azerism, like Pan-Turkism, is an expansionist ideology. But if it is a mean for the panturkists towards creation of Great Turan, for Iranian-minded figures it is a historically-based project on the way to returning lost territories of Iran.

Atrpatakan intellectuals have played (and have) an important role in the preservation, strengthening of the Iranian identity and struggle against pan-Turkic programs, who consider themselves to be Azeris rather than Turks, for the simple reason that the spread of Turkish language in Atrpatakan has only changed the language of that society, but not identity, yet language is not the sole criteria for nationality.

Therefore, the pan-Azerists with pan-Turkic thinking believe that the northern and southern regions of the Arax River were, for thousands of years, a part of the Turks’ homeland, which later fell under the rule of Iran, and by the treaties of Gulistan (1813) and Turkmenchay (1828) it was divided between Iran and Russia.

And Iranian-minded pan-Azerists believe that by the two treaties mentioned above, Aran and Shirwan which used to be inseparable parts of Iran, were cut off from Iran and annexed to tsarist Russia due to the misguided policy of the kings of Qajar dynasty and in the early 20th century for various political reasons, already renamed, came to exist as a separate independent republic.

Since the second view has a serious scientific basis, it should serve as a guiding idea also for us in our understanding of the relationship between PanTurkism and Pan-Azerism.

Summary

Sargis M. Mkrtchian
At the end of the 20th century, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the selfdetermination of its separate republics also brought to the fore in Iran the issues of identity, which had certain manifestations especially in the Azeri-populated regions of Iran.

Organizations and figures appeared in the public, presenting various demands, from the teaching of the mother tongue in secondary schools and educational and cultural freedoms to the idea of separating Atrpatakan from Iran and joining “Northern Azerbaijan” or the Republic of Azerbaijan.

What is identity? What are the elements of identity? Is the identity of the Azeris of Iran different from the identity of the Iranian people? What do we understand under Iranian identity? What are the Azeris of Iran like and how are they different from the rest of the Iranian people? Recording that elements of national identity are considered to be a united history, united religion, united homeland, united culture, united economy, united language, common feelings, united state and political heritage, collective consciousness, sense of belonging, we conclude that the Azeris are an Iranian ethnic group whose identity cannot be separated from the common Iranian identity. Speaking Turkish of Atrpatakan, which belongs to the Turkish language family, imposed on them as a result of the invasion and coercion of the Mongol-Turkic tribes, is not enough to prove that they are a foreign nation. Since the Azeris of Iran bear all the elements of Iranian identity – geographical borders, history, religion and confession (Shiite religion of Islam), their constant presence in the state-political system of Iran, their integration into the Iranian economic system, bearing the cultural heritage, etc., all are evidence of that the Azeris have Iranian roots and are Iranians.

Summary

Gevorg M. Ghukasyan
The article presents the foundations, origins and development of “soft power” theory, as well as the interests served by that theory. The post-war perception of traditional power and the need for a “soft power” theory are also discussed.

There are many parallels between the “soft power” theory and the lobbying institute, functional similarities and correlations in the framework of Political Science. The article tries to present that correlations, which can have a significant impact on the effectiveness of individual or complex applications of these tools and on better understanding of phenomena within political science.

The thing is that both the lobbying toolbar and “soft power” technology actually work on public opinion to have influence. The only difference is that normally the “soft power” technology dictated by the dominant actor, but in the case of lobbying, the decoration of public opinion is implemented in public scope, however, the ultimate target is not the society but the decision makers through that society. So the ultimate target of both are the elites anyway.

In “soft power” technology, one of the targets is the formation of decision-making frameworks with a specific outlook, and in the case of lobbying, as a rule, the decisionmakers are again the target. The toolkits for reaching the target may be different.

In other words, “soft power” policy usually seeks to form an elite, and lobbying attempts to turn the already formed elite into a target of political pressure, often using technological tools of “soft power” policy.

Therefore, it is important to understand the theoretical and practical aspects of the above correlation and many other parallels, as well as to find out what layers of parallel development apply to functional co-operation and theoretical combination.

Thus, both in the use of “soft power” and in lobbying, an attempt is made:
– some modification or targeted guidance of public opinion in ways that exclude traditional use of force,
– to achieve the desired decisions by methods that exclude the traditional use of force,
– to achieve the expected result through persuasion and attraction, as well as by sharing the same civilizational perceptions and values,
– to create a circle of friends and relatives to solve any issue,
– to take advantage of the wide range of tools and opportunities provided by public diplomacy, etc.

In both cases, we are dealing with unique and well-established institutions of the political process that are political forces and factors that exclude the use of traditional perceptions of force – military, financial transactions, and coercion, with the exception of corrupt manifestations of lobbying, but of an elementary nature. they don’t.

It should be noted that the theory of “soft power”, formed in the political school of a state seeking global influence, and, in effect, being a tool of state policy, was adopted and adapted by non-state organizations, especially lobbying organizations. So it is no coincidence that “soft power” tools began to be used, in fact, long before their introduction, which coincided with the unprecedented rise of the lobbying institute. Therefore, it can also be concluded that the advance and present rise of the “soft power” policy and lobbying institute have been largely dependent on one another.

To Armenian Pogroms in Azerbaijan in late 1980s – early 1990s

Summary

Narek A. Mkrtchyan Gevorg A. Tshagharyan

Key words – ‘‘The New York Times’’, open letter, Nagorno Karabakh, Sumgait, universal intellectuals, Armenian pogroms, international community, Michel Foucault, Edward Said, genocide, Antonio Gramsci, indifference, ‘‘Circle of Humanity’’.

In the last years of Soviet Union, the humanity faced several genocidal episodes like ethnic cleansings, destruction of cultural heritage of a nation, massacres, pogroms etc. More than seven decades after the Armenian Genocide, the Armenian nation was condemned to become a victim of ethnic cleansing and atrocities planned by the authorities of Soviet Azerbaijan. As a result of international indifference, the Armenian communities of Azerbaijan, particularly in Sumgait (February 27-29, 1988), Kirovabad (November 21-27, 1988) and Baku (January 12-19, 1990) have been subjected to atrocities. The aim of the paper is not the examination of these events, but the representation and study of an open letter signed by the internationally recognized intellectuals of the second half of the XX century. Being a joint initiative of the Helsinki Treaty Watchdog Committee of France and intellectuals from the Collège International de Philosophie, Paris the letter was published in “The New York Times” on July 27, 1990. Unfortunately, the letter had skipped the eyes of wider public in Armenia and abroad. The uniqueness of the letter can be measured by its content and the prominence of the signatories. It is more than obvious that the message of intellectuals was aimed at warning international community that necessary measures should be taken to prevent and save Armenians from another genocide. We translated the material from English into Armenian and provided it with introduction containing information about the signatories of the letter. Among them stand out Jurgen Habermas, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard, Sir Isaiah Berlin, Emmanuel Levinas, Paul Ricoeur, Charles Taylor, Luc Ferry and others. On the other side, the letter is discussed within the context of different theoretical approaches in order to shed light on the nature, position and influence of intellectuals on the world of crises.

Analysis and suggestions on the occasion of 70th anniversary of adopting the document

Summary

Armen Ts. Marukyan

Key words – Ottoman Empire, Genocide of Armenians, AllArmenian declaration, overcoming consequences of genocide, UN Convention on December 9, 1948, Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.

The all-Armenian declaration on January 29, 2015 according to which except the international recognition and condemnation also the task of overcoming consequences of the Armenian Genocide was set, again staticized a question of applicability of provisions of the UN Convention of genocide in relation to the crime committed against the Armenian people.

Still on May 28, 1951 in the Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice it was noted that under the conditions of lacking the convention the provisions specified in the Convention of the UN on genocide were obligatory for civilized countries even without conventional fixing. It follows from this that signing and entry into force of the convention cannot be speculated for the purpose of restriction of use of these principles and norms to the events taking place before the adoption of this document.

In 20 years after adoption of UN Convention on genocide the convention of the UN “About non-use of a limitation period to war crimes and crimes against humanity” on which the principle of inapplicability of limitation periods concerning military crimes and crimes against humanity irrespective of time of their implementation was adopted on November 26, 1968. This convention meant by “crimes against humanity” also the crime of genocide as it is formulated in UN convention on genocide.

Finally it is impossible to forget that consequences of the Armenian Genocide are still not overcome, and the Armenian people – the victims of this crime, continues to test its consequences, that is, it is about the continuing crime. Denialing policy of the Armenians Genocide on a national level by the modern Republic of Turkey and also implementation by the Turkish authorities of “cultural genocide” – destructions of historical and cultural heritage of the Armenian people on its historical homeland – in the Western Armenia, is continuation of genocidal policy of its predecessor – the Ottoman Empire. In this case the question of retroactive application of provisions of the Convention of the UN on genocide in general disappears.